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Abstract 
Post conflict reconstruction in Africa and the role of international community in post conflict 
recovery have dominated global debates especially in the post cold war era.  The arguments 
range from whether international policies and external intervention in post war countries 
helps in their economic recovery and ensures that there is no resurgence into war or whether 
it in fact plays a role in keeping the post war countries incapacitated, poverty stricken, 
dependent and susceptible to future conflicts. This research was motivated by the need to 
demonstrate how home grown mechanisms have higher chances of attaining sustainable 
peace and development as compared to the models imported from Western countries.  Post 
1994 Rwanda presents an ideal case study due to its unique approach to post-conflict 
reconstruction.  This research report investigated the different domestic programs adopted by 
the Rwandan government in its reconstruction process; the electoral reforms; infrastructure 
reforms; the refinement of the economic development and poverty reduction strategy 
program to suit the Rwandan situation which was the focus of the transitional government. 
This report further analysed the national reconstruction programs namely; the national unity 
and reconciliation commission and the Gacaca system of justice.  It was observed that these 
domestic programs registered significant successes in promoting peace and stability and 
propelled the nation to a quick and sustainable recovery.  It is concluded however, that even 
though Rwanda has been moving in the right direction in its reconstruction process, there are 
still considerable challenges that may threaten the national achievements made so far.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. Introduction 
This chapter introduces the role of domestic mechanisms in post conflict reconstruction in 
Africa.  The aim, objectives and the rationale of the study are explained.  Relevant 
literature surrounding the challenges of post conflict reconstruction and development is 
reviewed.  The focus on Rwanda as the case study due to its success story in its post 
conflict recovery after the 1990-1994 conflict is presented. This chapter provided the 
framework of this research report. 
1.1 Aim and objectives 
1.1.1 Aim 
With the creation of the African Union and other regional organisations like the East 
African Community (EAC), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with programs like the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development, Africa is seeking to break away from the shackles 
of poverty and under development.1  The purpose of this research therefore is to evaluate 
the impact of indigenous policies or home grown mechanisms like the Rwandan Gacaca 
program, the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) and the 
Unity and Reconciliation Programs among others, in the reconstruction of Rwanda and the 
role played by the traditional Western reconstruction programs of the IMF, World Bank 
and the donor community.  In this report, I will be examining the concept of the politics of 
inclusion and mass participation as an important ingredient for successful post conflict 
reconstruction.  Post conflict reconstruction strategies should be focused through local 
engines of economic recovery in order to foster lasting peace and sustainable 
development.2 I will demonstrate how for the last 15 years Rwanda has been engaged with 
the issues of development through the post conflict reconstruction programmes using 
unique approaches or home grown mechanisms.  I will investigate whether these policies 
can result in lasting peace and sustainable development.  The political, economic, social 
and legal mechanisms will be central in my research.  In other post conflict states, there has 
                                                 
1
  NEPAD., “African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework”, NEPAD Secretariat, Midrand, June 
2005 
2
 Addison, T., “Africa’s Recovery from Conflict: making Peace Work for the Poor”, in UNU-WIDER, 
Oxford University Press, 2003. Pg 4 
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been the tendency for the winner to take all, especially after elections following which 
frequently the oppressed becomes the oppressor.  In the Rwandan situation however it will 
be demonstrated that through the inclusion of all the erstwhile protagonists in governance, 
a successful post conflict state is reconstructed using local mechanisms where the local 
communities, the private sector and the state are the primary actors. 
1.1.2 Hypothesis 
Visionary participation, decentralisation, based on the principles of 
equitable management and resource distribution, and fostered by 
institutions of good governance leads to development in post conflict states. 
1.1.3 Rationale  
In order to achieve the above aims the following objectives were set out:  
The existing literature on post conflict reconstruction acknowledges the contribution of 
issues like local participation, indigenous innovations and domestic ownership of 
development but in a way suggesting that imported programs from international donor 
communities present the best hope for Africa’s development.3 This research is motivated 
by the need to demonstrate how home grown mechanisms have higher chances of attaining 
sustainable peace and development as compared to the models imported from Western 
countries.4 Due to the gaps in most of the existing literature, I will seek to critique the 
prevailing theories of post conflict reconstruction with the intent to come up with more 
workable recommendations for post war recovery. Therefore, this research is further 
inspired by the desire to investigate and test the hypothesis that Visionary participation, 
decentralisation, based on the principles of equitable management and resource distribution 
and fostered by institutions of good governance lead to development in a post conflict 
state.  Rwanda comes out in a very unique way on how it has transformed from a failed 
state to an almost developed state within a short time.  The miracle has been on how the 
instituted programs have been implemented to deal with the post conflict challenges. 
The Gacaca program for example is an exclusively Rwandan program that has played a 
fundamental role in promoting justice in order to prevent future conflicts. It draws its 
strength and uniqueness from the fact that it is locally based and was formed by the 
                                                 
3
 Demukaj, V. Foreign  Aid Effectiveness in Post Conflict Countries. University of Trento,  School of 
International Studies, 2009 
4
 Ibid. 
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Rwandan traditional justice system before the introduction of the modern system of justice. 
The program operates in several phases whereby there is information gathering in every 
cell using the cell members, identifying the suspects and the victims and then bringing 
them together for a local hearing in the same cell where the crimes were committed.  It 
brings justice to the people for purposes of reconciliation.  The suspects are brought to the 
people who participate in the execution of justice with the powers to pardon those who 
admit to their crimes and apologise hence initiating sustainable reconciliation and peace. 
The government has incorporated into its governance policies the World Bank programs of 
decentralisation in order to promote participation and efficiency.  The performance 
contract program for example is very peculiar in the way it has been implemented in 
Rwanda whereby everybody in leadership has to pledge to achieve a specific target within 
a specific time.  There are rewards for excellence and punishments for failure and it is a 
legally binding social contract.  This therefore has revived the public service, energized the 
private sector and accelerated development.  In the economic development and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy, the Rwandan story of steady progress has also offered useful lessons. 
It has embarked on a government steered private sector incorporating the local programs 
and the Structural Adjustment programs. 
1.2 Review of Relevant Literature  
Post-cold war Africa was characterized by conflict which crippled its economic, social and 
political development compared to the other continents.5 Endowed with significant mineral 
and human resources, conflicts have not allowed Africa to use these resources for its 
development and economic advantage to reduce its external debts and boost its social, 
economic and political stability. Instead countries like Eritrea, Angola, Uganda, Ethiopia, 
Burundi and Rwanda to mention a few, had their economic, social and political 
infrastructures destroyed by violent conflicts6. The end of conflict or the cessation of 
hostilities led to a transition from war to peace which necessitated sustained economic and 
technical assistance to rebuild the destroyed fabrics of these economies. Reconstructing the 
social, political and economic fabrics of war torn states or societies to avoid resurgence 
into conflict is a complex process requiring comprehensive national and international 
                                                 
5
 Hentz J, and Boas M, (2003), New and Critical Security and Regionalism: Beyond the Nation State. 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Aldershot, Hampshire. Pg. 216 
6
 Stewart, F., “Policies towards Horizontal Inequalities Post-Conflict Reconstruction”, in UNU-WIDER, 
Research Paper No 149, Nov 2006. 
  11
approaches7. The most successful post conflict reconstruction program was the Marshall 
plan which was designed for the reconstruction of post war Europe after the Second World 
War in 19488.  
Post conflict reconstruction in Africa and the role of international community in post 
conflict recovery have dominated global debates especially in the post cold war era. The 
arguments range from whether international assistance or external intervention in post war 
countries helps in their economic recovery and ensures that there is no resurgence into war 
or whether it in fact plays a role in keeping the post war countries incapacitated poverty 
stricken, dependent and susceptible to future conflicts. Anand argues that the rebuilding of 
the social and economic structures is as important as rehabilitation and reconstruction of 
the destroyed physical infrastructures and that each conflict is unique and must be handled  
in a specific manner hence making the process of reconstruction very difficult.9 The tools 
used in one region or country cannot necessarily be successfully used in another. For 
example Nassrine states that, 
“when I am asked to describe the challenges facing countries trying to restore peace and 
stability after years of conflict, I often say it is like trying to tie your shoelaces while 
running – it is an impossible task, but it must be done.”10 
Protracted conflict destroys the social, political and economic fabrics of a country. 
Therefore the economic circumstances of post conflict countries are distinctly different 
from those of other normal poor countries in need of aid for development. The urgent need 
                                                 
7
 Ibid 
8
 The World Bank, Post conflict Unit, Social Department, Conflict Prevention, Post Conflict Reconstruction: 
Perspectives and Prospects, Paris, France, 1998.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
9
 Anand, P.B. “Getting Infrastructure Priorities Right in Post Conflict Reconstruction”, in UNU-WIDER, 
Research Paper No. 2005/42, 2005. 
10
 Nassrine Azimi.  .Training and Human Capacity-Building in Post-Conflict Countries Unite nations 
Institute of Training and Research. Peace Park Hiroshima, 2003; retrieved from 
http://www.unitar.org/hiroshima/Training_and_Human_Capacity-Building_in_Post-Conflict_Countries, 0n 
June 25, 2009 
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to restore the destroyed social, political and economic infrastructure together with the 
collapse of revenue makes foreign aid especially vital for post conflict states11. 
Tony Addison argues that war undermines the livelihoods of the poor by destroying 
essential services hence reducing the abilities of the poor to participate in the national 
recovery process. This point further makes this research important as it seeks to investigate 
the role of local mass participation in the recovery process. Addison further demonstrates 
that to have a successful reconstruction process, challenges of money laundering, arms 
trafficking and groups of those profiteering from conflict must be dealt with decisively. It 
is perceived that they pose the greatest danger to the peace process and reconstruction 
because it is seen as a disruption to their businesses. Conflicts in African states have many 
times been due to contestation of resources and unequal economic opportunities among 
other factors, economic recovery and stability. therefore becomes particularly important to 
avoid relapse into war.12 That said, it is important to note that for the process of post 
conflict reconstruction to be successful, the project must not be left to the international 
community alone. The primary mandate for recovery should be with the aid recipient and 
the donor as a development partner if the goal of sustainable development is to be 
realized13. This is because with participation comes commitment and ownership of the 
process which is important for the economic growth and development of any country. 
Therefore the international community should provide policy advice to the specific country 
and later help to finance the proposed development strategic programs until the country has 
revived its economy to the point where it can finance and manage its economic growth and 
development14. Therefore this research will focus on the role of these local strategic 
development programs which I have called the home grown mechanisms in post conflict 
reconstruction and development. It is my contention that the case of Rwanda presents the 
best case study among African post conflict states in assessing the impact of locally 
devised programs in the recovery of the country. Like Somalia, Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Sudan, the Republic of Rwanda went through a period of conflict that resulted 
in the 1994 Rwandan genocide where about one million people were massacred in less 
                                                 
11
 Ball, N. The Challenge of Rebuilding War-torn Societies. Washington, D.C. Overseas Development 
Council, 1996. Pg 46 
12
 Rugumayo, S. and Gbla, O. Studies in Reconstruction and Capacity Building in Post Conflict Countries 
inAfrica: Some Lessons of Experience from Rwanda, University of Dares lama Tanzania and Fourah Bay 
University Sierra Leon, Dec. 2003.  
13
 Demukaj, V. Foreign  Aid Effectiveness in Post Conflict Countries. University of Trento,  School of 
International Studies, 2009, Pg. 06 
14
 Mhone, G.C.Z. ‘Dependency and Underdevelopment and the Limits of Structural Adjustment Programs in 
Africa’, SAPES TRUST, Harare, 1999.  
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than 100 days15. Unlike other countries, Rwanda has taken advantage of the post conflict 
reconstruction programs to develop through its integrated politics of inclusion. Visionary 
participation built on decentralisation and set on the principles of equitable management 
and resource distribution, fostered by institutions of good governance has led to 
development in post conflict Rwanda. 
1.2.1 Theoretical Frame Work  
Given the fact that in international relations the meaning and definitions of different 
concepts are subject to contestation, it is imperative to try and define or adopt definitions 
from selected sources. This research relies on Tony Addison, Paul Collier, Krishna K. and 
James k. Boyce’s understanding of post conflict reconstruction. Concepts and definitions 
adopted by international institutions and organisations like the World Bank and the United 
Nations will are prominent in this report. For example the World Bank views post conflict 
reconstruction as the support for the transition from conflict to peace in an affected country 
through the rebuilding of the social economic frameworks of the society16. Transition from 
war to peace is achieved when peace accords are signed and implemented or when one 
party is decisively defeated by another to end the conflict. This initiates the process of 
recovery which involves all the different sections of the society and the international 
development community as a critical role player17. 
Some scholars have argued that the rebuilding of war-devastated countries and 
communities is a series of non-integrated activities carried out by international agencies 
and governments, serving political and other agendas. The result many times is that 
calamities of war are often accompanied by the calamities of post war reconstruction hence 
disregarding the importance of sustainable development in post conflict countries18. This 
therefore further provokes debates on whether the body of knowledge related to post-
conflict reconstruction is sufficient and with cohesive theories that can inform 
governments and the international community on post war recovery. 
 
                                                 
15
 Mamdan, M. (2001) When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nationalism and the Genocide in 
Rwanda. Princeton University Press. P 199 
16
 The World Bank, Post conflict Unit, Social Department, Conflict Prevention, Post Conflict Reconstruction: 
Perspectives and Prospects, Paris, France, 1998.  
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Moss, T., Pettersson, G. and van de Walle, N. ‘An Aid-Institutions Paradox? A Review Essay on Aid 
Dependency and State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa’ in Center for Global Development, Working Paper 
No. 74, Washington DC, 2006, p. 3 
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1.2.2 Research Methodology   
The methodology used in this research report is qualitative method. This is therefore to a 
greater extent be a desk based research report. The primary data collection consists of 
existing literature on the subject of post conflict reconstruction and development. These 
include books, journal articles and reports of research and investigative panels, set up by 
groups, International Organisations and governments working in the areas of conflict 
prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution and post conflict reconstruction.  The 
Rwandan government policy documents and official statements of the agencies involved in 
post conflict reconstruction were consulted. The University of Witwatersrand libraries, the 
South Africa Institute of International Affairs library, The Rwandan National University 
library, the East African Library Makerere University, The Centre for Conflict 
Management (Rwanda); and Internet materials will be researched and analysed as well. 
Other libraries will also be relied upon to acquire the materials that are not available in the 
above mentioned research centers. 
1.3 Chapter Outline  
1.3.1 Chapter One Introduction 
It will be the introduction of the report, outlining the problem to be investigated, exploring 
the significance of the study, the literature review, the conceptual framework and the 
research methodology. 
1.3.2 Chapter Two: Exclusionism And Conflict: The Case Of Rwanda 
This chapter will interrogate the concepts of exclusionism and conflict. It will be argued 
that the underlying cause of conflict in Rwanda was the politics of exclusion that 
characterised both the pre independence and post independence Rwanda. Therefore, to 
realise a successful post conflict recovery program, deliberate inclusive programs are 
critical. 
1.3.3 Chapter Three: Post Conflict Government Reforms 
It will focus on the post conflict government reforms and economic transformation. The 
transitional government and the adopted policies of inclusive leadership and 
decentralisation will be interrogated. Furthermore, chapter three will include an analysis of 
the implementation methods of the economic development and poverty reduction 
strategies. 
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1.3.4 Chapter Four: National Unity And Reconciliation Program 
This will deal with the national unity and reconciliation program that was instituted soon 
after the conflict to deal with issues of reconciliation, instilling patriotism in the citizenry 
and preventing future conflicts. The role of this program in promoting social welfare and 
the development of Rwanda, as a whole will be assessed. 
1.3.5 Chapter Five: GACACA System  
 This will investigate the role of the Gacaca justice system in the reconstruction of the 
country. This chapter will investigate whether this form of restorative justice will ensure 
justice, restore peace and stability in the country and facilitate sustainable development. 
1.3.6 Chapter Five: Conclusion and Recommendations  
 This will provide a conclusion of the report by summarising the observations. This chapter 
will also highlight the strength and weaknesses of domestic initiatives in post conflict 
reconstruction. It will be in this chapter that recommendations for future post conflict 
reconstruction programs will be provided. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The analysis of the politics of exclusionism as the root of the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide and the historic background of the nation are the focus of this chapter.   
2. Exclusionism and Conflict: the case of Rwanda 
Post conflict reconstruction aims at not only restoring the stability of the political, social 
and economic spheres of a state but to set it into motion for progressive growth and 
development.  It is understood that the gains obtained from a cease fire or a peace 
agreement or a military victory of one party will be short lived if the underlying causes of 
the conflict are not immediately addressed.  Reconstruction of a state is only successful if it 
manages to prevent immediate and future relapse into conflict and propels a country into 
economic growth and development.  The Rwandan story illustrates a case where post 
conflict recovery focused on both preventing immediate and future conflict and embarked 
on programs aimed at improving the lives of the citizens hence growth and development. 
To understand the rationale for the adopted social, economic and political policies in post 
conflict Rwanda, a look at the historic perspective of the conflict is essential.  This chapter 
will analyse the concept of exclusionism and the role this played in the conflict in order to 
understand the rationale of the new policies of inclusion in Rwanda. 
 
Since the end of the cold war, conflict prevention, management and resolution, 
peacekeeping, peace building and more importantly post conflict reconstruction have 
become some of the most widely written about issues in international relations and 
political studies.19 Even though conflicts are still rife in most developing countries, 
diplomacy is the most advocated means of solving disputes and conflicts.20 In trying to 
prevent or resolve conflict in international relations, different theories have been advanced 
about its causes and the most appropriate methods for resolution in order to initiate 
workable reconstruction or recovery programs. There is some measure of agreement that 
protracted conflict is many times associated with underdevelopment or uneven 
development emanating from exclusion and deprivation.21  
                                                 
19
 Hentz J, and Boas M, (2003), New and Critical Security and Regionalism: Beyond the Nation State. 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Aldershot, Hampshire. Pg. 216 
20
.Ibid 
21
 Ibid 
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To begin with, exclusion refers to a situation in which a certain section of the population, 
whether ethnic, regional or religious, is deprived of the right to belong to or access the 
resources and opportunities available to similar groups.22 In most cases those controlling 
the state machinery exclude those perceived to be in the other group and consequently, the 
excluded groups seek to fight for their rights and their share of government resources.  It is 
important to note that in most cases the state justifies the exclusions or disputes exclusion, 
which provokes debates on whether rebellions or violent resistance can be justified.23 As 
aforementioned, Africa has been the scene of most conflicts in the world after the Second 
World War.  Such conflicts emanating from the political exclusion usually form a vicious 
cycle whereby the excluded groups feel that the only way for them to access the 
opportunities and resources available to others is through violent conflict. This perception 
that the excluded and marginalized groups can only redeem themselves through war has 
resulted in a vicious cycle of conflict in Africa24 
  
The above assertion can be supported by the dynamics of the recent conflict in Kenya 
whereby even though the violence was sparked by disputed elections, one of the 
underlying factors could be argued to have been  the perceived exclusion of the other tribes 
(dominated by the Luo) by the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin elites.25 The agitations seemed to 
be resonating with the argument that the elites in the ruling party monopolized all the 
opportunities available at the expense of the majority of Kenyans.26 Similarly, the conflict 
in Ivory Coast in early 2000 centred on disputes over identity whereby some people 
considered themselves as having exclusive rights as citizens while others were excluded 
from asserting similar rights.  This contestation of identities to determine who should be 
included and who should be excluded have been responsible for the conflict in Ivory 
Coast.27  
 
 It would be insufficient to highlight areas where conflict has been as a result of politics of 
exclusion in Africa without any mention of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
conflict and the Rwandan genocide of 1994.  Suffice it to argue therefore, that the wars, 
                                                 
22
 Gijsberts M, Hagendoorn A, (etr) (2004) Nationalism and Exclusion of Migrants: Cross-National 
Comparisons. Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Aldershot, Hampshire. Pg.1 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Mamdan, M. (2001) When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nationalism and the Genocide in 
Rwanda. Princeton University Press. P 199 
25
 Murela M, The Dynamics of the Kenyan Crisis. The Daily Monitor. 16th Feb. 2008 Pg. 12 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Young Tom, (2003) Readings in African Politics. Indiana University Press. Pg. 136 
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which have ravaged Eastern DR. Congo for the last 14 years, are a result of political 
exclusion of the populations from the eastern part of the country.  The Banyamurenge in 
the Kivu province in the eastern part of the country have been rejected as not belonging to 
DRC and excluded in terms of resource distribution and reconstruction of the country28.  In 
response to the threat of expulsion from what they perceive as their God-given right to 
belong and to benefit from the national resources, different groups in the DRC have 
resorted to violent means in a bid to reclaim their perceived rights, hence the protracted 
conflict in the DRC.29 The Rwandan case will be analysed to demonstrate the link between 
exclusion and conflict and to show that peace and stability can be sustainable only if 
participation or ‘inclusionism’ is at the centre of reconstruction programs. 
 
In analyzing conflicts in Africa exclusion has not been a very common phenomenon or 
concept used, often because writers seldom use more direct reasons like oppression, 
dictatorship and corruption even though these are the symptoms of the politics of 
exclusion.  It can therefore be argued that there is an extricable link between political 
exclusion and conflict in Africa.  This perceived inequality in the distribution of resources 
and national or regional benefits breeds discontent, making conflict inevitable.30  It offers 
fertile ground for ideological extremism, social, economic and political exclusion thereby 
making future conflict unavoidable and reconstruction or recovery impossible.  That said 
however, there is no unified theory of conflict that has been advanced. It is therefore 
unlikely that one will find an all encompassing explanation that is adequate to explain 
conflicts of different types in different countries or regions.31  
 
Although the connection between exclusion and conflict is not outright, it is a major 
underlying factor in protracted conflicts and unless given serious attention conflict 
resolution and post conflict reconstruction may remain theoretical for a very long time in 
African International Relations.32 The short sighted quick-fix approach of regional 
interventions whereby focus is on restoring the status quo has resulted in short lived 
                                                 
28
 Huggins C, Institute for Security Studies, (2005) From the Ground Up: Land Rights, Conflict and Peace in 
Sub- Saharan Africa. Institute for Security Studies. Pretoria. Pg.115 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Op. Cit. Mamdan M. 
31
 Ramsbotham, O, Woodhouse T,  and Miall H, (2005), Conterporary Conflict Resolution: Prevention, 
Management and Resolution: Polity, Stafford BC. Pg 101 
32
 Ibid. 
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stability and reversed the gains of post conflict reconstruction in most parts of Africa.33 
The fire brigade operations that seek to quickly put out the fire in conflict zones ignore the 
deep-rooted historical politics of exclusion that breed and fuel conflict.34 It is therefore 
justified to conclude that the politics of exclusion have been one of the primary causes of 
conflict in many African states especially and Rwanda serves as a very good example. 
2.1 Historical perspective of the conflict in Rwanda 
When African states and scholars search for causes of challenges and conflicts plaguing 
the continent, the tendency has often been to blame it on colonialism.35 This state of affairs 
has culminated in African states blinding themselves to the role they themselves have 
played in crafting some of the problems they encounter.36 Nonetheless, the Rwandan 
conflict is a mixture of colonial and citizenry ethnic consciousness which depleted the 
sense of nationhood and bred ethnic nationalism - the bedrock for the 1994 genocide.37 
Noted below are some of the factors which paved way for the blood bath that Rwanda 
experienced in 1994. 
 
Colonialism took over the African continent and its societal structures in a way that led to 
the underdevelopment of the continent in general and the development of the economies of 
the colonialists.  Societies were deeply divided and the institutions therein were crafted in a 
manner that would facilitate the exploitation of the African continent to develop the 
countries in the North.  Thus the post colonial leaders had to deal with the legacy of divide 
and rule, oppression, slavery, tribalism and racism.38  Due to the different types of colonial 
experiences in Africa, the new leaders adopted different strategies of governance which in 
turn have yielded different results across the continent.  For some countries, independence 
was the long awaited breakthrough for economic development and political stability while 
for others it became the beginning of oppression, exclusion and marginalization leading to 
                                                 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Hodder B.W, Harris D.R, (1967), Africa in Transition: Geographical Essays, Barnes & Noble, Monroe, p7 
 Le Vine V.T, and Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, (1967), Political leadership in Africa: 
post-independence generational conflict in Upper Volta, Senegal, Niger, Dahomey, and the Central African 
Republic, Hover Institution Press, Stanford CA, p 58 
3
 Deng FM and Lyons T,(1998), African reckoning: a quest for good governance. Brookings Institution 
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conflict and war.39 Violence became the order of the day, hindering economic development 
and growth. Rwanda and many other countries in the Great Lakes region fall in this 
category of post colonial states characterized by conflict, mass violence, lack of 
development, authoritarian regimes, and the influx of armed groups with the aim of 
fostering regime change40.  It is important to note that no sooner had Rwanda got its 
independence from Belgium than a revolutionary regime took over power and proceeded 
with the plans of mass violence to wipe out specific members of its own population. To 
better understand the dynamics of the Rwandan state and the conflicts that have 
characterized its post colonial history, it is vital to discuss the origins of violence in the 
history of the country, looking at the pre- colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. 
 
Before colonialism Rwanda was inhabited by a people called Banyarwanda who were 
divided along economic lines.  There were three main economic activities and the people 
were categorized according to the occupation that they undertook. The occupations were 
pastoralism, farming or cultivation, and gathering or hunting. Those who were cultivators 
came to be called Bahutu; those who were pastoralists came to be called Batutsi; and the 
gatherers were the Batwa. 41They all lived together, dependent on each other socially and 
economically.  The pastoralists however, due to their economic superiority, assumed 
leadership roles within the society followed by the cultivators and the Batwa being the 
lowest subordinates.  It is important to note that the status or the identity of the 
Banyarwanda was not natural.  One was not born into a specific group but rather their 
status was a historic construction.  It is vital to mention at this point the fact that an 
individual or a family was able to move from one identity to another through a process 
called kwihutura. If a Hutu bought cows and became a pastoralist, he and his family 
became Tutsi and at the same time if a Tutsi became poor and lost his cows and went into 
cultivation, he and his family became Hutu.42 These temporary identities were instrumental 
in ensuring stability and opportunity for all.  The economics determined the politics, and 
everybody lived alongside each other peacefully until the arrival of German colonialists.  
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The advent of German colonialists in the early 19th century introduced instability in the 
socio-political relations of Rwanda when they sought to naturalize the differences among 
Banyarwanda, which hitherto were only economic.  Indeed, race, as a political identity, 
was imposed by the force of the colonial laws during the colonial period.  After the Second 
World War, Rwanda was put under the auspices of Belgium as the new colonialists.  
Through the use of divide and rule strategies they used the Batutsi who had already been 
ruling alongside the Germans as the chiefs and had assumed leadership roles in the 
community to govern the country.43 The Tutsi became chiefs under the white colonizers 
while the other groups; the Hutu and the Batwa, became predominantly their subjects.  It is 
vital to mention that this is when the seeds of conflict were sowed in Rwanda.  As we shall 
explore later, these political identities were reproduced and reaffirmed in the post-colonial 
era, hence the perpetuation of conflict between ethnic groups or races resulting in the 1994 
genocide. 
 
It is important to note that race was attributed to those perceived as alien and ethnicity was 
attributed to those perceived as indigenous.  In this case, the Hutu became the indigenous 
while the Tutsi became the alien. Because these identities were naturalized, the process of 
kwihutura was abolished which meant that one was born and stuck in one status or social 
identity.  It is therefore justified to argue that this was one of the root causes of conflict 
since one group was more privileged than the others.44 Those who perceived themselves as 
condemned to subordination and oppression were bound to revolt in future against those 
they perceived as their oppressors. This was the introduction of the politics of exclusion, 
whereby all the privileges and resources were reserved for the Tutsi, while the Hutu and 
Batwa were largely excluded and oppressed socially, economically and politically.45  It can 
thus be suggested that it was these naturalized identities, privileges and exclusions that 
became the basis of the conflicts that ensued, culminating in violence in 1994 and 
producing genocide in Rwanda.  
 
The introduction of democracy ushered in the Rwandan revolution of 1959, towards the 
end of colonialism. The Hutu majority who were oppressed and excluded revolted and 
resisted the prevailing politics of exclusion and oppression, hence the first major conflict. 
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The majority Hutu took over power and in 1961 Rwanda was set free from the colonial 
bondage of the Belgians and was set to becoming a new state.46 It should be mentioned that 
with independence, African states were placed in a position where they were to rearrange 
their priorities for purposes of stability, growth and development.47 The basic issue, with 
respect to the relationship between public policy and societal goals in Africa, is the extent 
to which governments are able to satisfy the people’s expectations of independence.  For 
instance, their sincere hope that freedom from colonial rule would usher them into a new 
era of equal opportunities, basic rights and freedoms which were unheard of during 
colonial rule.  Like most other newly independent African states, the new Rwandan state 
was faced with the unprecedented challenge of civil administration for the realization of its 
national goals.48 The Belgians handed over power to the first President of the Republic of 
Rwanda in 1961, after the introduction of democracy.  Since the principles of modern 
democracy dictate that the majority make binding decisions and take on leadership roles, 
Gregoire Kayibanda, a Hutu leader of the Paramehutu political party, became the first 
Rwandan president.49 
The politics of exclusion and oppression were reaffirmed by the new government whereby 
the ideology that drove the Kayibanda regime was that of exclusion, displacement and 
replacement.  The displacement of the Tutsi and the replacement of the Hutu to positions 
of power, influence and privilege led to the creation of an exclusive Hutu state from the 
exclusive Tutsi state hence perpetuating the politics of social, economic and political 
exclusion and oppression.50  One can therefore argue that independence never brought any 
fundamental change in the country.  What was seen is the reversed trend of oppression and 
supremacy where Hutu oppression and Tutsi supremacy were reversed leaving the 
Kayibanda regime with the objective of revenge rather than nation building. This state of 
affairs was a recipe for continued conflict.  
The living standards of the general population were very low and had not improved since 
independence.  The state failed to create a good environment for industrialization to take 
place. Things had not changed for the ordinary Hutu; they were still poor and lacked the 
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opportunities to leverage themselves.  Unemployment was escalating, leading to further 
agitation at the state’s capacity to turn around the events.51 It is important to note that this 
regime controlled the process of national socialization whereby the Tutsi were no longer 
seen as a race but rather were transformed into an ethnic group.  This was a fundamental 
transformation since it meant that they were all Banyarwanda. It however did not change 
the status quo.52 The exclusion, oppression and legal discrimination was even intensified 
through organized institutions like schools where one was required to identify oneself as 
Hutu, Twa or a Tutsi. 53Since the prevailing ideologies seemed not to bring rapid benefits 
to the ruling class, instead ideologies of extremism, intolerance and tribalism developed 
and gained prominence, leading to further conflict.54  
 
The overthrowing of Kayibanda’s regime in 1973 by a group of Hutu military generals 
from the Forces Armes Rwandaise (FAR) in a military coup and the party Mouvement 
Revolutionaire National Pour Le Develipment et La Decraties (MRND)  led to  the 
subsequent government of General Juvenal Habyarimana as the new Hutu president.  This 
government introduced new ideas that seemed to be all inclusive especially during their 
campaign to be recognized as a legitimate government.55    Unfortunately these ideas never 
made it into the new constitution and the system of oppression, predation and exclusion 
still prevailed.56 Whenever there was discontent with government, the regime was quick to 
attribute the worsening situation to the past Tutsi regime using it as a scapegoat.  This 
continued to create hatred between the two tribes. Furthermore, the Habyarimana regime 
suppressed all forms of political opposition using ethnicity as the reason to stay in power. 
Orders were given and expected to be carried out throughout the country and this 
eventually became a very effective tool for the mass mobilization of the Hutu civilians 
against their Tutsi counterparts who the regime perceived as enemies.57  
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It is important to note that due to these unbearable conditions coupled with mass killings of 
the Tutsi in both the Kayibanda and Habyarimana regimes, many Tutsi citizens were 
forced to flee their own country in search of safety in neighbouring countries.  This influx 
of refugees from Rwanda into the neighbouring countries of Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, 
Burundi and even to far countries like South Africa arising as a result of the politics of 
exclusion has been responsible for the social, economic and political instability that has 
prevailed in the Great Lakes region throughout the post-colonial period.58 
 
The government’s failure to transform the state itself, its institutions and ideologies and the 
failure to overhaul the departments that represented the nature and character of the colonial 
state was to result in shame and disaster for the country a few years later.  This legalized 
oppression and exclusion of the Tutsi by the Hutu coupled with the government’s inability 
to transform the economic and social lives of the ordinary Hutu was going to be the fuel 
for genocide in 1994.59 It is important to note however that even though conflict was 
brewing, there were other factors responsible for the outbreak of war in 1990.  
 
As a result of the existing relations with the Habyarimana government in Rwanda, some of 
these countries pursued policies that were very harsh towards the Tutsi refugees. For 
example, the Milton Obote government in Uganda sought to expel all Rwandan refugees or 
repatriate them back to Rwanda.  It was at this time that many of these refugees joined the 
Ugandan opposition under Yoweri Kaguta Museven and resisted the Obote government. 
The resistance ended up in a guerrilla warfare waged against Obote’s government by 
Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) in 1981.60 This war lasted until 1986 
when the National Resistance Army overthrew the Government of Obote’s successor, Tito 
Okelo Lutwa, who had also overthrown Obote in a military coup.  The NRM victory in 
1986 changed the politics of the region in that there was a new sense of revolution and 
liberation in the region.  This turn of events in Uganda was very unsettling for the 
Rwandan government due to the fact that Uganda’s new government consisted of a large 
number of Rwandan refugees, especially in its military wing. 61 
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With a base and support from the new government in Uganda, the Rwandan refugees in 
Uganda and other parts of the world began to demand that the Rwandan government allow 
them back into their country. Significantly, it was at this time that Habyarimana, insisted 
that Rwanda was too small and therefore had neither the space nor the resources to 
accommodate the Tutsis in the country thus necessitating war in 1990.62 The Rwandan 
refugees in the diaspora led by Fred Rwigema who was a senior military officer in the 
NRA mobilized the Tutsi refugees and launched a full scale offensive war against the 
Rwandan government in 1990. It can be argued that it was the alienation and rejection of 
the Tutsi by the Hutu that led to the 1990 Rwandan conflict. 
In response to the invasion by the Rwandan Patriotic Movement (RPF), the Rwandan 
government mobilized a national mass response.  Due to the hatred that already prevailed 
in the population, Hutu leaders easily mobilized their fellow Hutu citizens for the operation 
to exterminate all the Tutsi that lived on  Rwandan soil, arguing that the Tutsi were coming 
back to subject the Hutu to slavery within their own country. 63Although the killings had 
been going on throughout the war period, April 1994 became the most extreme month in 
the history of the country, with Hutu militias called Interahamwe carrying out a well 
organized and sponsored genocide that left over one million Tutsi and moderate Hutu  
killed.64 Even though all this was happening in Rwanda, it was not isolated from the 
international politics of the day.  The RPF which was hosted and backed by Uganda also 
received support from other western countries especially the Anglophone countries, 
whereas the Habyarimana regime was backed and sponsored by the DRC, France and 
Belgium.  This external support worsened the conflict and resulted in what was seen during 
the 1994 genocide.  The 1990-1994 Rwanda conflict not only claimed uncountable lives 
but destroyed the social and economic fabric of the country. The economy collapsed, and 
the livelihood of the population was destroyed.  Rwanda thereafter found itself without a 
public sector or a private sector but a hungry and angry population. Humanitarian 
organisations like the World Food Program and the Red Cross became very crucial for the 
survival of the Rwandan survivors. It was therefore this situation immediately after the 
conflict that gave the transitional government and the international community a blank 
sheet to draw a program for the countries post conflict reconstruction. 
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The post conflict transitional government understood that since political, social and 
economic exclusion were fundamental causes of the social stratification and the conflict; 
sustainable peace, unity and successful recovery together with progressive development 
were going to be possible only if centred on policies of inclusion and participation for all. 
This therefore explains the government pursuit of an agenda of participation and 
decentralization, based on the principles of equitable management and resource 
distribution and fostered by institutions of good governance as shall be seen in the 
following chapters. 
In summary, this chapter discussed the policies of exclusion that were embedded in the 
national policies of Rwanda as one of the primary causes of the 1990-1994 conflict.  It has 
been observed that although the colonial policies perpetuated the policies of oppression, 
displacement and subordination that prevailed in the pre-colonial times, the post-
independence leadership of Rwanda sought revenge and exclusion as opposed to 
development and reconciliation hence a vicious cycle of exclusionism and conflict.  This 
chapter further reinforces the argument that post-conflict reconstruction can only be 
successful if the underlying factors responsible for the conflict are acknowledged and 
tackled accordingly.  It has been highlighted that the 1990-1994 Rwandan conflict was 
unique in its background and in its execution and therefore its reconstruction strategies had 
to be unique in order to succeed. 
 
  27
CHAPTER THREE 
This chapter looks at post-conflict reconstruction in Rwanda as a project of different 
partners, notably; the international community/donors, the local population and the 
Rwandan government. The domestic mechanisms as opposed to imported policies 
from international organisations are discussed in the adopted electoral reforms, 
infrastructures reforms and the economic developments and poverty reduction 
strategy programme.  
3. Post Conflict Rwandan Government Reforms and the Role of International 
Community 
The end of conflict after the RPF victory led to a transition from war to peace, which 
necessitated substantial economic and technical assistance to rebuild the destroyed fabric 
of the country65.  The reconstructing however of the social, political and economic fabrics 
of a war torn state or society to avoid resurgence into conflict is always a complex process 
requiring comprehensive national and international solutions.  Due to the fact that conflict 
destroys the productivity of a state and its people, it is obvious that conflict states cannot 
fund their immediate recovery or reconstruction. It is this point that makes the international 
community or the donor’s critical players in the post conflict reconstruction process. 
A lot of theories have been advanced on the role of international community in post-
conflict situations highlighting that the international community ought to have a significant 
role in the process of reconstruction. Whereas this chapter does not disagree entirely with 
this thesis, it contends that significant responsibility must be with the recovering states if 
quick recovery and sustainable peace is to be realised. This chapter further explains that 
the donors assisted to rebuild Rwanda but the policies and programs for the post-conflict 
reconstruction were significantly domestic, hence the rapid improvements in the public and 
private key areas, notably; the electoral reforms, and infrastructure reforms. 
 
                                                 
65
 Ball, N. The Challenge of Rebuilding War-torn Societies. Washington, D.C. Overseas Development 
Council, 1996. Pg 48 
  28
Foreign aid therefore becomes the hope for recovery and sustainable peace through 
programs like disarmament and reintegration of former combatants, resettlement of 
refugees and the revival of the public service to provide the urgently needed social 
services.  It is important to note that even though foreign aid for post conflict 
reconstruction seems to be the only hope for recovery, it comes with strings attached which 
bind the recipients to specific policies and drafted recovery program. It is from this 
perception that debate on the role of foreign aid in post conflict reconstruction ensues. This 
chapter will focus on the role of the international community in post conflict government 
reforms and economic transformation. The transitional government and the adopted 
policies of inclusive democratic leadership and decentralisation will be interrogated. 
Furthermore, this chapter will include an analysis of the implementation methods of the 
economic development and poverty reduction strategies. 
3.1 The role of international community in post conflict reconstruction in Africa: 
Post conflict reconstruction in Africa and the role of the international community in post 
conflict recovery have dominated global debates especially in the post cold war era. The 
arguments range from whether international assistance or external intervention in post-war 
countries helps in their economic recovery and ensures that there is no resurgence into war 
or whether it in fact plays a role in keeping the post war countries incapacitated poverty 
stricken, dependent and susceptible to future conflicts.66 Further discussion has been on 
issues such as; when is a country declared as a recovered state or for how long should 
foreign aid be a source of income for developing nations.67 Protracted conflict destroys the 
social, political and economic fabric of a country. The economic circumstances of post 
conflict countries are therefore distinctly different from those of other normal poor 
countries in need of aid for development.68 The urgent need to restore the destroyed social, 
political and economic infrastructure coupled with state inability to generate revenue on its 
own, makes foreign aid critical for post conflict states.69 
Notably, conflicts in African states have many times been due to contestation of resources, 
unequal social and economic opportunities. Economic recovery and stability based on 
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equal opportunities for all becomes particularly important to avoid relapse into war.70 That 
said, it is important to note that for the process of post conflict reconstruction to be 
successful, the project must not be left to the international community alone. The primary 
mandate for recovery should be with the aid recipient and the donor as a development 
partner if the goal of sustainable development is to be realized. This is because with 
participation comes commitment and ownership of the process which is important for the 
economic growth and development of any country.71 Therefore the international 
community should provide policy advice to the specific country and later help to finance 
the proposed development programs until the country has revived its economy, and can 
finance and manage its economic growth and development.72  
Post-war aid comes from both developed nations and Non Governmental organizations 
(NGOs) to the country that has been devastated by the war. It is directed to different 
sectors and projects for purposes of meeting the recovery challenges, hence paving way for 
development. Since the concerns are usually more than what the aid budgets can 
accommodate, prioritising areas of urgent attention becomes a necessity. These areas 
include among others, technical assistance to restore capacity.  
Because war destroys human life, the country looses its skilled labour force and as a result 
there is need for capacity building for economic recovery and sustainable development, 
and financial packages to facilitate social programs become dire. Skills are also lost as 
result of migration to other countries. Because of war the educated and skilled tend to be 
the first to flee due to demand pull factors from other more stable countries. As a result of 
this loss the recovery of these countries tends to take even longer due to absence of 
indigenous skilled labour which limits the ability of a country to recover quickly73. This 
leads to poor countries hiring expensive expatriate labour to advise on and manage the 
recovery programs. Aid therefore is necessary to pay the hired expatriates to ensure the 
success of development programs74.  
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For stability to be realized in post conflict societies there must be programs aimed at 
healing the wounds of war. For example counselling programs for the victims of violence, 
reintegration and rehabilitation programs for former combatants, reconciliation programs 
to unite the warring parties or communities, become very essential in laying the 
foundations for solid peace and stability.75 This is a factor for foreign direct investments 
that is necessary for economic development to take place.  
Furthermore, priority is put on financing government expenditure. Due to the fact that war 
destroys government revenue, there is need to assist the recovering state to meet the 
national budget in order to have a functional government without plunging the country into 
deeper deficits.76 It is at this point that debt relief becomes an important form of aid to post 
conflict states. Debt relief cancels the government obligation to pay back the money 
borrowed and the accumulated interest. This helps the recovering country to focus on 
reinvestments rather than on clearing the accumulated debts.77 
Government can also focus on long term programs to deal with problems of poverty. War 
destabilizes the normal livelihoods of the concerned communities, and as a result a severe 
threat to food security is created. Hunger therefore becomes a very serious problem in post 
conflict communities hence making food aid a very important form of foreign aid in post 
conflict reconstruction in Africa78. This speaks to the role played by organizations such as 
the World Food Program (WFP) in feeding the affected communities as governments 
embark on the relevant economic sectors. The provision of food to communities by 
international donor Agencies and organizations between the periods that lapse from 
planting to harvesting of crops becomes unavoidable79.  
Post conflict states in Africa find themselves in deeper poverty when compared to other 
developing countries. This as a consequence makes it harder for these countries to achieve 
their goals of reducing poverty80. Countries emerging out of conflict have signed up along 
aside developing countries and international organizations to, reduce by half extreme 
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poverty among other goals by 2015 in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)81. To 
meet these objectives, these countries will require doubling the aid and effort in order to 
take significant strides in this direction. It is important to note that this assistance from the 
international community comes as a package with stringent conditions as indicated above 
and these are mainly through the Structural Adjustment Programs. The MDGs speak to the 
major constraints that the African continent is facing especially extreme poverty and the 
devastation that HIV/AIDS has caused in the last four decades.82 
3.2 Post Conflict Domestic initiatives in Rwanda 
Convinced that bad governance lays the foundation for future conflict, Rwanda after 1994 
focused on good governance especially in the drafting of the 2003 constitution and 
establishment of independent institutions of governance.83  Good governance in this sense 
meant participation for all, consensus, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, 
effectiveness, efficiency, equity, inclusivity, and respect for the rule of law.84 Whereas the 
ideals were welcomed with excitement in 2003, their implementation was not as 
enthusiastic as their drafting. On democracy and political governance, Rwanda has made 
very significant strides considering the country’s history. There has been the establishment 
of independent institutions and separation of powers to tackle the challenges of human 
rights like the National Human Rights Commission which is mandated to ensure that all 
the organs of government respect the rule of law and the people’s rights at all times and 
investigates all allegations of human rights abuses in the country.85 This is meant to avoid 
the mistakes of the past governments where state organs were free to trample over the 
rights of citizens. Furthermore, the establishment and empowerment of the Ombudsman is 
an indicator that the regime is committed to accountable leadership and the fight against 
injustice and corruption.86  
The office of the ombudsman is charged with the responsibility to represent the interests of 
the public by investigating and addressing the concerns of the citizens whether against the 
government or against fellow citizens. This institution is a very new endeavor in Rwanda 
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and ensures that the people have enough avenues to channel their complaints without 
hindrance or intimidation, as was the case in the previous governments hence reducing the 
chances of future conflict resulting from suppression and intimidation.87 Even though the 
above institutions were equally very important, the government also focused on democratic 
transition in terms of electoral reforms. Suffice to note that even though these institutions 
have been put in place, a lot still needs to be done in the observance and promotion of 
human rights as Rwanda is still seen as the most intolerant state in the East African region. 
Furthermore, Rwanda’s engagement with the DRC did not reflect the actions of a state that 
respects human rights and the rule of law. There were reported mass killings and 
destruction of property, which necessitated a rebuke from the United Nations.88  
3.3 Electoral Reforms in Post Conflict Rwanda 
Immediately after the 1994 Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) victory, the new government 
embarked on a process of consultation and dialogue with the population. Since Rwanda 
had never experienced true democratic governance apart from ethnic majority rule, this 
was aimed at understanding the views of the people before any policies or executive 
decisions were implemented.89 This approach was unique considering the fact that 
international organizations and the donor community were pushing the new government to 
quickly adopt the proposed recovery policies like national elections and economic reforms. 
Countries such as France and Belgium were hoping that elections would reverse the RPF 
military victory and rule since they were assured of a Hutu majority. Nonetheless, the new 
government put democratic governance at its forefront.90  
The national mobilization and the formation of the broadbased post genocide government 
that brought together all the political parties that never participated in the genocide and the 
establishment of the Transitional National Assembly evidenced this. In a bid to find home-
grown mechanisms for the reconstruction of the country, the government embarked on 
policies of inclusiveness and political consensus building through local townhall meetings 
popularly called ‘Urugwiro’. This initiative to involve the community in advising 
government became very popular between 1998 and 2000 as they attracted all the local 
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actors in the country91. They included politicians, intellectuals, business community, 
religious leaders and the common members of the community. Even though the 
international community was not involved, very important recommendations like gradual 
democratization and decentralization came from this local initiative.  
The government used the recommendations from the Urugwiro meetings, to organize the 
first national elections in 1999. These elections were also very unique as the idea was a 
‘bottom up’ approach as opposed to an ‘top down’ approach which was being proposed by 
the international community. Rwanda decided to begin with local cell and sector council 
elections as opposed to presidential and parliamentary elections. Due to lack of funding for 
the process the government employed a cheaper method of queuing to vote for individual 
candidates92. It should be noted however that this process came at a big cost to democracy 
as the outcome was seen as being too controlled by government. To further insure 
sustainable democratic governance the government established the national election 
commission to deal with all the election processes. 
In May 2003 the Rwandan post conflict national referendum was held to adopt the new 
proposed national constitution. This was preceded by the presidential elections which were 
seen as very significant93. Although the referendum to adopt a constitution was not unique 
to Rwanda, it was different in the manner in which national mobilization for participation 
took place. Public meetings throughout the country in all the three national languages at 
the time were organized and attendance was made mandatory. The government insisted 
that the population must understand the draft constitution and propose amendments before 
the referendum took place. This was significant because the process and the outcome were 
owned by the local community hence explaining the landmark turnup for the referendum 
amidst international community boycott to a large extent94. The government mobilized the 
local communities, the private sector and individual volunteers to successfully fund the 
referendum process. Therefore the constitution was primarily based on popular 
participation as opposed to expert drafting as commonly seen in other post conflict sates. 
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The electoral reforms in Rwanda were not without controversy and challenges. Due to the 
political situation that had worsened in the country due to the insurgencies and whereby the 
national defense forces were at war in the DRC with rebel forces and opposition parties 
perceived to be preaching divisions banned, political intolerance and human rights abuses 
became rampant.95 The promised press freedom was forgotten and to some extent military 
rule became eminent. A lot of extra judicial killings and disappearances of opposition 
leaders and political activists were reported in the media outside the country and through 
human rights organizations like the Human Rights Watch. These factors caused 
antagonism between the state and the international community hence leading to the 
reduced financial support from 2000 to 2004.96 It is the manner through which the country 
has managed to revive and go through the fragile post conflict situation that makes Rwanda 
exceptional. Rwanda was able to quickly reinstate the rule of law even amidst severe 
insecurity in 2004 and again win the confidence of the international community to support 
the national reconstruction and development process. It is important to note that even if the 
early elections in the reconstruction of Rwanda left a lot to be desired, the 2008 local 
council and parliamentary elections were commended by all the observers as being free 
and fair, reflecting the spirit of democratization, national building and development and 
thereby making Rwanda a success story in post conflict reconstruction.  
The following section brings to light Rwanda’s effort in coming up with poverty reduction 
strategies to stimulate national development.  Noteworthy achievements have been made 
through the execution of internally developed strategies.97 While the World Bank PRSP’s 
which were implemented to eradicate poverty between 2000 and 2005 were difficult to 
implement and therefore did not meet much success, the Government was able to modify 
them and come up with own strategies which yielded better result in the drive for poverty 
reduction.98  These home grown strategies focused on the allocation of public expenditure 
to key sectors to achieve the desired growth and development.99  
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3.4 Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy in Rwanda (EDPRS) 
Poverty reduction program strategies have been employed in many developing countries 
and especially in post conflict states to kick start national development. Rwanda’s 
significant success has been attributed to its implementation strategies100. Whereas the 
World Bank proposed PRSP was fundamental in the fight against poverty between 2000 
and 2005, there were serious difficulties in its implementation, which primarily hampered 
its success101. Instead of repeating the same programs that were not working as it is the 
case in most developing countries, the Rwandan government restructured the PRSP 
program and came up with the EDPRS to fit into the home grown national vision for 
economic growth and development. This strategy focused on the sectoral allocation of 
public expenditure which was distributed to maintain momentum in the social sectors of 
education, health and water and sanitation while also targeting agriculture, transport and 
Information and Communication Technology ICT, energy, housing and urban 
development, good governance and rule of law, proper land use management and 
environmental protection.102 
On the whole, resource mobilization and allocation was realized through broad-based local 
participatory methods. The successful implementation of the decentralization initiative 
therefore required considerable capacity building to strengthen both central and local level 
authorities more importantly103. Even though this reform was a condition from the World 
Bank and the IMF as part of the structural adjustment programs, Rwanda embraced it due 
to the way it fitted in the countries own strategies to avoid the mistakes of the past104. The 
international financial institutions in support of the recovery of the country sponsored these 
programs. It is therefore justifiable to reaffirm that not all the conditions for development 
aid are necessarily bad for a country. What is important is for the respective countries to 
have strategic plans for development aid to be useful. 
Development aid for the reconstruction of Rwanda came with proposed programs from 
international organizations like the United Nations through United Nations Development. 
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Programs like Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy’ (DPRS) to ensure a steady 
recovery of the economy. Being well-financed strategic programs, the government 
embraced them as it drafted its own strategies for economic development and poverty 
reduction.105 The government came up with a vision for total transformation and 
development, which is called Rwanda Vision 20/20 ‘Umurenge’.  It is a government plan 
that strategizes and projects its direction for the next twenty years.  In utilizing both the 
donor funds and the donor proposed strategies for economic development, the government 
advanced a modified DPRS to form Economic Development and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (EDPRS), which represents a comprehensive development agenda and the need to 
ensure progress across both the productive and social sectors of the country106. The EDPRS 
forms more of an operational tool or mechanism rather than an inspirational vision 
statement for the wishes of the government and the donor community107. 
The Rwandan leadership has continuously argued that external aid is good only as a form 
of assistance for a country to gain some form of social and economic stability but not as a 
pillar for sustainable development. It is from this opinion that the government seeks 
economic development that is not entirely dependent on external aid. The British 
government through the Commonwealth fund has agreed to fund this program to 
eventually lead to a self-sustaining economic growth108. The British aid has facilitated the 
capacity building of the Rwanda Revenue Authority both in funding and technical support 
for the government to begin financing its own development. There has also been a 
deliberate focus on the development of the private sectors to attract foreign direct 
investments in the country. 
3.5 Infrastructure Reforms in Post Conflict Rwanda 
Infrastructure in broader terms includes goods and services which are essential ingredients 
of quality of life and economic activity and these include water supply and sanitation 
services, health and education services, transport and communications, electricity and other 
energy sources. As noted above the 1990 to 1994 Rwandan war destroyed the very weak 
infrastructure that existed. The reconstruction of the country could not be realized unless it 
put infrastructure as a priority for development. This was premised on the understanding 
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that infrastructure failures in post-conflict reconstruction can become weapons in the hands 
of combatants and opponents of peace to derail and undermine the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the reconstruction process.109 This may aggravate civil contention or 
demoralize staff working in remote locations and thus further delay the process of state 
rebuilding. Furthermore, infrastructure failures can act on gender and other aspects of 
identity and exaggerate incapacity, vulnerability and disability.110 
The uniqueness of Rwanda’s approach in infrastructure development is in its priorities. 
Even though the reconstruction covered all the essential areas of road network 
construction, revival of the transport system, educational facilities, hospitals and civil 
aviation, human resettlements and capital creation was emphasized.111   Having had a huge 
population either internally displaced in camps or in refugees in the neighboring countries, 
the new government sought to create homes for the homeless Rwandans. The grouped 
settlements commonly known as ‘Imidugudu’ were constructed and handed over to 
families that were homeless.112 This went a long way in reassuring the population that the 
government was there to serve the needs of its people irrespective of ethnicity or religious 
affiliations. It is important to note however that there have been criticisms on the criteria 
used to select which areas benefit from this program first. The critiques argue that the RPF 
government concentrated on resettling the returning Tutsi refugees and ignored the poor 
homeless Hutu members of the society.113  
Recognizing the fact that Rwanda, being a landlocked country without a lot of natural 
resources in terms of mineral wealth was going to find it difficult to mobilize resources to 
fund its own growth and development, the government embarked on a vision to develop 
the national human capital as the main national source of future capital. Focus was put on 
capacity building and the infrastructure development has focused on the development and 
transformation of the countries information communication technology (ICT). The 
government sought to become a service centre for the region and an ICT hub for the 
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continent. It should be mentioned that in 2009 Rwanda was ranked the fastest developing 
country in ICT on the Africa continent.114 
The debates surrounding the role of the international community in post conflict 
reconstruction have been explored. It has been observed that the challenges of 
reconstruction are enormous for the recovering states but the people must own the process 
and products of reconstruction. Rwanda came out as a success story in this chapter due to 
fact that the Rwandan government insisted on domestic mechanisms for its reconstruction 
as opposed to the adoption of the proposed policies in their entirety. The role of the 
international community has been observed as vital for the success of Rwanda’s 
reconstruction and development. It has been argued that the government focused on 
national participation as a tool to achieve inclusive development and avoid the mistakes of 
the past. In the reconstruction process Rwanda used a unique approach whereby national 
policies were reached after considerable consultations with the general population. This 
chapter further looked at the priorities government embarked on to quicken its recovery. 
They included reforms in both the public and private sectors to lay a foundation for good 
and democratic governance and economic growth and development. It has however been 
indicated that although much has been accomplished, more needs to be done especially in 
the areas of government transparency and human rights protection. It can therefore be 
concluded that the recovery of Rwanda was primarily due to the significant role of the 
domestic mechanisms employed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
National unity and reconciliation is the back born for peace and stability in any post-
conflict state. This chapter focuses on the unique approaches of Rwanda’s 
reconciliation through dialogue and solidarity camps. 
4. National Unity and Reconciliation Program 
The 1994 Rwandan genocide astounded the world. While this catastrophe will never be 
forgotten, Rwanda offers an inspiring example of how solid leadership and an active civil 
society can engage citizens in rebuilding their communities.115 Rwanda can claim 
noticeable success in making headway from its darkest hour to a new era marked by 
economic development, increased security and most importantly, the hope that national 
unity is indeed possible. The establishment of the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission (NURC) was as a result of nationwide consultations on how to forge a way 
forward for a country that had just emerged from a devastating conflict.116 In a bid to 
advance homegrown mechanisms for peace, stability and sustainable development, the 
creation of this commission was informed by the unique Rwandan traditional means of 
solving disputes and ensuring reconciliation and unity.117 The process of reconciliation 
involved the revival of what is called ‘Ingando’ taken from Kinyarwanda language 
meaning retreating to strategize for the community. This was through the creation of 
dialogue forums in schools, in the civil society and in government institutions, 
reconciliation summits, leadership academy, inter-community exchanges and 
consultations. Several challenges have emerged around the process of national 
reconciliation that threatens the fragile stability.118 
This chapter focuses of the creation of the Rwandan national unity and reconciliation 
commission as an attempt to forge peace and stability for the future. After a conflict there 
is always an attempt to create peace and harmony between the former warring parties. This 
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chapter looks at how Rwanda revived its ancient traditions like ‘ingando’ in a bid to 
reconcile the population after the 1994 genocide. The Rwandan unique approach to 
reconciliation through dialogue, mediation and arbitration is discussed in this chapter.  The 
‘Ingando’ solidarity camps is analysed as a very controversial program with the potential 
to reverse the gains of the Rwandan reconstruction process.   
The national unity and reconciliation commission is a national institution provided for by 
the national constitution that was adopted by the Rwandan people in 2003 in a national 
referendum.119 It is worthwhile to mention that the idea of establishing a commission for 
national unity and reconciliation was carried on from the Arusha Peace Accord signed in 
1993 between the warring parties.120 The main objective for such a commission was to 
assist the government of national unity then projected, to cultivate unity and reconciliation 
among the people of Rwanda who had gone through long periods of bad governance 
characterized by divisions, discriminations, human rights abuse and acts of violence.121  
After the tragic genocide of 1994, the establishment of the National Unity and 
Reconciliation Commission was made even more necessary. In March 1999, the 
Government of National Unity established the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission with the responsibility of using all available means to mobilize and sensitize 
Rwandans for the purpose of promoting unity to avoid a repeat of the 1994 events in the 
future.122 However, in a bid to forge unity through the commission, the government has 
created more tension through formal and informal approaches of fighting divisionism and 
genocidal ideologies in the country.123   
4.1 Seeking Unity and Reconciliation through Dialogue 
From a situation where neighbors were killing neighbors, religious leaders planning against 
their congregations with the killers and colleagues murdering colleagues, dialogue between 
the two camps seems impossible yet there can never be reconciliation without dialogue.124 
This is the reality that faced post conflict Rwanda. In trying to do the impossible, Rwanda 
has again registered significant successes in bringing the people to discuss the issues that 
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divided them hence developing ideas to unite them.125 Dialogue as opposed to the other 
methods of conflict resolution like negotiations and mediation helps to bring opposing 
sides together to devise means for sustainable peace. Whereas in negotiations each party 
aims at advancing their point of view as the only most appropriate view, in dialogue all 
views are seen in the same light as alternative constructive ideas on how to achieve the 
desired goal of peace and unity.126 This Rwandan approach offers hope for peace due to the 
fact that it brings together members of the community at different levels and in different 
capacities as victims of the genocide, perpetrators, the returnees, community leaders, 
religious leaders, young and old to discuss the prevailing issues and come up with 
workable solutions.127 
District and provincial groups composed of local leadership in charge of education, health, 
and infrastructure have been created. These dialogue groups discuss macro and micro 
issues. For example, the issue of population management was recently addressed in a 
culturally sensitive manner, to encourage families to consider the benefits of having 
smaller families.128 This was sensitive due to fact that the previous regime used population 
density propaganda to exclude the Tutsi in the diaspora arguing that there was not enough 
space in the country to accommodate them. Dialogue clubs were created in all provinces of 
Rwanda, so that citizens would have formally organized meetings in which to discuss and 
debate genocide-related topics, as well as current challenges to communities with 
participants drawn from different focus groups throughout the country.129 
Dialogue as a conflict prevention approach is supposed to be used to promote honest 
discussion on previously forbidden topics like ethnicity, democracy and human rights 
although the situation in Rwanda is different as shall be explained in this chapter.  
Dialogue in its various forms has become an indispensable tool in national efforts to 
promote better health and gender equality among other issues that are critical to ensuring 
unity, security and development. Public dialogue initiatives conducted by partnerships of 
government, academic and non-governmental organizations reach beyond community 
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forums and seek to address specific cultural behaviors such as health and gender.130 
Various forms of dialogue on these topics are complemented by other activities intended to 
promote national unity such as ‘Umuganda’, the local word for community service.131 
Once a month, Rwandans are asked to participate in development projects such as road and 
bridge repairs or public schools rehabilitation. Umuganda provides opportunities for local 
leaders to engage in civic education, the importance of reconciliation for post conflict 
development and create dialogue about HIV/AIDS and other crucial topics of public 
interest.132 
To a large extent, these dialogue forums and clubs have helped to foster unity and 
reconciliation mainly due to the fact that they are based on the Rwandan traditional 
dialogue models whereby after vigorous debates and disagreements all the members are 
gathered around something they all share to celebrate and calm down.133 After the sessions, 
they gather together and drink their locally made beer share meat and dance together. This 
is important because it reminds them that they are all one and unity and reconciliation is in 
their local and national interest. Since most communities cannot afford to fund these 
initiatives, Non Governmental organizations and government institutions together with 
donors facilitate these processes.134 
Rwanda’s return to its traditional customs, predominantly in the various forms of dialogue 
being utilized in the country, appears to be a feasible way to combine traditions with other 
recognized mechanisms of unity, reconciliation and conflict resolution. Another prominent 
tradition revived in Rwanda’s reconstruction, is the tradition of ‘Abunzi’.135 These are 
primarily community-respected elders that help to solve family and community disputes. 
Abunzi are being used to address various family disputes, such as conflicts related to land 
or inheritance. This tradition has been rejuvenated in the post-genocide era, so that 
problems can potentially be solved at a local level before going to national courts.136 For 
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example, if there is a conflict between former neighbors or between a husband and wife, 
she may well first go to the Abunzi committee who then call in the husband, and they try to 
resolve the matter together.137 Abunzi are more or less akin to mediators in the community. 
Citizens with family disputes are asked to report cases first to the Abunzi, ahead of taking 
them to the local court.  The role of Abunzi in post conflict Rwanda has become 
increasingly formalized. Abunzi receive training, and have standard guidelines for 
mediating domestic conflicts.138 
Whereas it is evident that dialogue has greatly improved the strife that persisted in post 
conflict Rwanda and has created a culture of discussion in engaging both policy makers 
and community members hence laying the foundation for peace and reconciliation which 
was unheard of in the previous regimes, it is vital to acknowledge the fact that dialogue 
alone will not erase Rwanda horrifying past. Although through dialogue the people devise 
means of solving disputes and the challenges of poverty and rapid population growth 
among other issues, the government should continue exploring means of dealing with other 
serious challenges like poverty and unemployment which have the potential to threaten 
unity, peace and stability.  
4.2 ‘INGANDO’ Approach to Unity and Reconciliation in Rwanda 
The word ‘Ingando’ is taken from the Kinyarwanda verb "Kugandika" that means to halt 
normal activities in order to reflect on, and find solutions to national challenges.139 In 
ancient Rwandan traditions, Ingando was first developed by the military in their 
adventures. Before colonialism, this was a popular practice that the regimes used to 
mobilise troops and advisers discuss ways to keep the kingdom safe and strong.140 As 
Rwanda sank deeper into colonial and post-colonial conflict the institution of Ingando lost 
its relevance and was no longer practiced. Moreover, the royal institutions, which had used 
the practice to hold Rwanda together for centuries were abolished.141 With the 
establishment of the national unity and reconciliation commission, the practice of Ingando 
was revived due to its relevancy in post conflict Rwanda.142  
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After the NURC (National Unity and Reconciliation Commission) was established, it 
officially developed Ingando as a tool to build coexistence within communities. Among 
the first groups of beneficiaries to this project was the ex - combatants who were in the 
process of integration into the community.143 The programme later expanded to include 
school going youth and students at secondary and tertiary levels. By 2008, the training was 
extended to informal traders, and other social groups including survivors, prisoners, 
returnees, religious leaders, community leaders, women and youth.144 
 
Ingando programmes or solidarity camps as they are commonly called, are carried out 
nationwide and most are co-facilitated with communities, whereby the provincial and local 
administrations provide support with logistics and the NURC and its partners provide 
lodging and meals and transportation is usually covered by the participants.145 Ingando 
programmes involve residential camps, bringing together between 300 and 400 people per 
programme for between 3 weeks to 2 months depending on the focus of the sessions.146 
The numbers also fluctuate due to factors like presidential pardons to prisoners, which lead 
to huge numbers of prison release although at each prison release, 1000 prisoners undergo 
Ingando.147 Topics are covered under five central themes: analysis of Rwanda’s problems; 
history of Rwanda; political and socioeconomic issues in Rwanda and Africa, rights, 
obligations and duties and leadership.148  
Although the principle of Ingando is largely upheld as necessary for the successful 
recovery of post conflict Rwanda, its process and content in the designed sessions is 
criticized for being a tool for the RPF government to indoctrinate the nation.149 Ingando 
project has therefore focused on the propagation of pro-RPF ideology, a dangerous 
undertaking in a country in which political indoctrination and government-controlled 
information were critical in sparking and supporting the 1994 genocide.150 Furthermore, a 
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successful unity and reconciliation program must take place in a society that values human 
rights, democracy and freedom of speech and expression. Rwanda has been found wanting 
in the areas of human rights and press freedom hence creating an atmosphere that is not 
suitable for an ideal Ingando.151 
At the revival of Ingando, the government aimed at orienting the returnees who had lived 
either all their lives or for a bigger part of their lives outside Rwanda. It was important to 
re-socialize the returning Rwandans who were predominantly Tutsi.152 It was essential for 
government to bring together the diverse repatriated population into camps where they 
would live together and eat together and develop confidence that they could actually live 
together as one people in one country.153 The RPF also saw an opportunity to sell its 
ideology to the population by explaining its policies and programs as the best for the 
reconstruction of the country. It was also very important for a program to prepare the ex-
soldiers and ex-combatants before they are reintegrated into the civilian communities that 
are most of the time contradictory to their previous lifestyles.154 It therefore became 
compulsory for ex-RPF, ex-FAR who did not flee to Congo, and ex-combatants who 
fought in Congo (ex-Armed Groups) to attend Ingando camps as pre demobilization, pre-
discharge orientation program. Repatriated ex-FAR who originally fled to Congo have also 
been required to attend Ingando.155 
The program even though intended to foster unity and reconciliation has been used by the 
RPF government to neutralize the opposition hence ensuring its own political survival. For 
example the ex-combatants who are predominantly from the opposition are forced to join 
the national defense force in order for government to completely control their movements 
and activities.156 Furthermore, these solidarity camps have led to continued muzzling of the 
opposition. This has been through the numerous lectures aimed at praising the RPF policies 
and demonizing the proposed alternatives from the opposition. The opposition does not 
have the opportunity to come and offer their views on issues of governance, democracy, 
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unity and reconciliation hence explaining its weakness and the continued growth of the 
RFP in the country.157 
The solidarity camps prepare the returnees, ex-soldiers and e-x combatants for either 
demobilization or reintegration into the general population. Throughout the period of this 
program the government tries to instill confidence and optimism into the candidates 
insisting that the RPF led government had made the country a better place for all to live 
and excel in all spheres of live.158 The teachings focus on the assumption that there is love, 
peace, unity and reconciliation outside the walls of the camps. Even though it is vital to 
instill optimism in a population, it can be very dangerous to create false hope in people. 
The many people who leave the camps excited with hope for a better life and are better 
future are welcomed by harsh realities of rampant unemployment, excruciating poverty 
coupled discrimination by their communities. They are seen as either genocidaires or 
government agents depending on which community they are returning to. Furthermore, 
even if they are told that the communities are now united and less tribalistic, the reality is 
that there are still tensions between the Tutsi and the Hutu which is evidenced through the 
way the members of the community form cliques of the their own tribal members.159 These 
phenomenon’s have countered the reconciliation progress as the frustrated members resort 
to illegal activities of robberies, rape and murder or even rejoin their friends in the bush 
arguing that the government promises were aimed at trapping them and not to foster a 
united Rwanda for peace and prosperity.160 
Ingando for Rwandan students is the most widespread structure of Ingando in the country. 
Rwandan students who complete secondary school are required to attend these solidarity 
camps before they begin their university studies. Students spend an average of two months 
in the camps studying the achievements of the government, the distinction of the 
Banyarwanda, history, the ethnicity question, unity and reconciliation, Western and 
Eastern philosophy, and economic and technological concerns facing the country.161 There 
are three phases of the Ingando process for students. Students spend the first two weeks 
engaging in activities that encourage free thought and critical analysis. During the second 
phase, the students are supposed to categorize political, economic, and social struggles 
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facing the nation. In the final stage, the students break up into smaller groups and debate 
and talk about possible solutions to these national challenges.162 Rwandan university 
students are the future leaders of Rwandan society, and the vast majority has attended 
government-run solidarity camps. Hence, the Ingando process provides the government 
with the opportunity to shape the opinions of young students and orient them in the 
direction of the RPF-led government, helping to create a generation of RPF loyalists.163 
It is important to remember that the Rwandan government has outlawed all references to 
ethnic differences or identification and labeling.  The government insists that there are not 
ethnic differences in Rwanda there are only Banyarwanda. This is the message that 
dominates the solidarity camps especially for the youth. This is in the hope that the young 
will grow identifying themselves as Banyarwanda rather than Tutsi, Hutu or Twa.164 
Although the government rationale is understandable considering the way previous 
regimes used these identities for political purposes, it is risky to try and erase history for 
purposes of political stability or survival. Instead of teaching tolerance between the 
different ethnicities among the Banyarwanda at the camps, the government camps lead to 
obliteration of difference.165  This is seen as a ploy by the minority Tutsi government to 
survive against the Hutu majority hence creating a suspicious population on the honesty of 
government in its pursuit of unity and reconciliation.166 Therefore although the project of 
Ingando is good in promoting patriotism, unity and reconciliation and to tackle the 
challenges of the day through dialogue, its implementation has left it as a tool for the RPF 
government to perpetuate its dominancy in the social and political transformation of the 
country. 
Like in other post conflict states, denial of the facts during and after the conflict has 
dominated the reconstruction process and seriously threatened true reconciliation.167 In the 
Rwandan situation denial does not focus on the past but rather on the present and the future 
of the country. State denial has taken the form of refusal to sufficiently acknowledge that 
the divisions, which resulted in the 1994 genocide, have not been eradicated and that 
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people still find them personally and politically important.168 In the interests of unity and 
reconciliation, the government has declared it nearly criminal to identify as either a 
Muhutu or Mututsi. Hence everyone is today simply Rwandan. Now the terms have 
cunningly shifted to those of survivors or victims, and perpetrators or accused, but 
everyone knows that these terms echo the opposition of Tutsi to Hutu. Moreover, locally-
speaking, everyone still knows to which group everyone else used to belong. This means 
that the removal of these categories from public discussion does not work to erase the 
significant role they have played in the past and how they have shaped personal and 
collective identities. 
Post-conflict reconstruction process can be futile if there is no reconciliation between the 
former warring parties. Future conflict would be inevitable in the near future. This chapter 
analysed the initiatives instituted by the Rwandan government and the Rwandan 
population to forge peace between the perpetrators and the victims and many times 
between the alleged perpetrators and victims in order to create an environment suitable for 
peace and development. The national unity and reconciliation commission was discussed 
as the institution mandated to facilitate the realisation of unity and reconciliation after the 
1994 genocide. It was observed that even though the intention of reviving ingando as a 
means of re-educating the citizens and avoiding the mistakes of the past leadership, it is 
playing the role of a national mobilizing tool for the RPF regime hence undermining the 
principles of unity reconciliation and democracy. This chapter further highlighted that even 
though the reconciliation process is essential for a successful post-conflict reconstruction 
program, the whole process of reconciliation in Rwanda is undermined by the government 
policies of censorship and denial. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Chapter five discusses the revival of the unique Rwandan traditional justice system 
(GACACA), to fight impunity and provide justice for the victims of the 1994 
genocide. It further analyses the establishment and failures of the international 
criminal tribunal for Rwanda.    
5. The Gacaca System 
At the core of the post-genocide Rwandan society and politics has been the necessity for 
reconciliation firstly to relieve ethnic tensions and secondly to put to an end to a culture in 
which laws established to secure punishment for crimes committed against the populace 
were routinely flouted by a select group and thereby creating a culture of impunity.169   
The International Criminal tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) which was established as a 
measure to root out impunity in the international system and to contribute to the process of 
national reconciliation and the maintenance of peace in the region has not yet achieved this 
goal.  Its failure extends beyond its shortcomings and may be attributed to the standards 
International Criminal Law that cause it to be an unsuitable reaction to criminalizing mass 
violence.170. The Gacaca Courts were created with the intention of instituting a more 
expeditious means of delivering justice for the more than 100,000 people accused of 
genocide, war crimes, and related crimes against humanity.171  Developed from an 
indigenous form of restorative justice it was anticipated that the ideologies and mode of 
operation of these courts would ease the failures of “Arusha Justice” at the tribunal and 
would in addition serve to penalize or reintegrate these suspects into society.172  The 
restorative aspects of Gacaca arose from the fact that the suspects would be tried and 
judged by their community offering the victims a chance to both air their experiences and 
participate in sentencing and thereby providing a therapeutic effect.173  Gacaca being a 
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means of restorative justice however does not rule out its potential for provoking ethnic 
tension as long as it serves as an instrument of Tutsi power.     
In an effort to make the post-conflict reconstruction project successful and sustainable in 
Rwanda, the government employed domestic mechanisms in the re-establishment of the 
judiciary by reviving the old traditional justice system. This chapter discusses the Rwandan 
Gacaca program designed to work alongside the modern national judicial system. Its 
achievements and challenges as a restorative justice system are discussed. This chapter 
further explores the response of the United Nations to fight impunity after the Rwandan 
1994 genocide. This is through an analysis of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda’s activities since its establishment.  
The identity of participants in Gacaca has been politicized; the perpetrators have 
effectively remained Hutus and the survivors Tutsis. The government’s refusal to allow for 
the prosecution of crimes allegedly committed by the RPF through the Gacaca has 
additionally strengthened the view that Tutsi survival is dependent on Tutsi power and 
impunity.174  Real possibility that Gacaca could fail to erase the perceptions of impunity in 
post-genocide Rwanda would come at a much higher price for reconciliation than the 
ICTR’s failure.  It is key that the relevance of justice after the genocide attest to the 
suitability of retributive and restorative models of justice in a post-genocide society 
besides, the model of Justice must be acquiescent to the disposition of the regime that 
imposes unity under an ethnic minority.175 
The political regimes in Rwanda had for over thirty years incorporated ethnic sectarianism 
and separation into their systems of governance which made it easy for the local populace 
to participate in the execution of harassment and mass execution organized by their 
political leaders.176  Mass atrocities committed against the populace over the years 
remained unpunished and reinforced the culture of impunity to the point that those who 
generated and executed the 1994 genocide were able to accomplish their heinous 
mission.177 The current Government of National Unity inaugurated on July 19th 1994 
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assumed the responsibility to eliminate the culture of impunity, emphasizing that the 
authors and perpetrators of crimes against humanity be brought to book while the victims 
of such crimes be recompensed.178  It is in this regard that the Organic Law No. 08/96 of 
August 30th 1996 on the organization of legal proceedings in cases of contraventions that 
comprise crimes against humanity was conceived and adopted.179     
Meting out the traditional form of justice failed to achieve its objective as by the year 2000 
approximately 120,000 alleged genocidaires were still under detention awaiting trial, 
crowded into prisons across the country.180 It was then acknowledged that at the rate in 
which trials were being undertaken it would take more than 100 years to prosecute all the 
prisoners held without even beginning to tackle cases of those who were in exile and those 
still within the community who could not be incarcerated for lack of space.181  A further 
limitation arose in light of the fact that while efforts were being concentrated on 
prosecution the delays in achieving this also meant delay in embarking on the 
reconciliation process necessary to bring the people together after the genocide. 
It was then that the idea of Gacaca courts mooted, inspired by traditional means of conflict 
resolution not only to be able to accelerate the trials of suspects but very importantly to 
focus also on reconciliation for the post-genocide Rwanda.182   The Gacaca courts are a 
method of participatory justice whereby the victims are given the chance to speak out 
against the atrocities committed against them and participate in their sentencing.  This 
method, which puts justice partially into the hands of the victims, allows them to contribute 
to the judgment and punishment of the authors and perpetrators of genocide related 
crimes.183  Exceptions to this system were those whose crimes were within the jurisdiction 
of the ordinary courts and which therefore were to be tried according to common law 
rules.184  
5.1 The failure of the international criminal tribunal for Rwanda 
The United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter by resolution 955 of 8th November 1994, created the Internal Criminal Tribunal 
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for Rwanda (ICTR).185  This move was designed to contribute to the promotion and 
maintenance of peace and reconciliation in post genocide Rwanda by ensuring the trial and 
prosecution of persons responsible for crimes against humanity within the genocide period 
and other such violations of international law in neighbouring states during the same 
period.186  The tribunal has its seat in Arusha in the, United Republic of Tanzania also the 
home of the African Court for Human and Peoples Rights.187  Among the aims of the 
tribunal was the need for African countries to understand the lessons of the Rwanda 
genocide in order to prevent similar situations from occurring.  The weak institutions in 
Africa, lacking in independence are generally to blame for the promulgation and 
entrenchment of the culture of impunity particularly under authoritarian regimes that do 
anything to remain in power.188  
The tribunal has however come under condemnation for what is seen as its role in 
harboring criminals and delaying justice in light of the fact that some of the most wanted 
conspirators are fugitives and are at large; this also has a bearing on the view that the 
United Nations is perhaps simply trying to boost its image and cover up its inability to 
prevent the genocide in the beginning.189   The Rwandan government has for example 
charged UN Security Council member states like France for its lack of support for the 
ICTR in apprehending and delivering suspected planners of the genocide to face justice.  It 
has long been alleged that the former first lady of Rwanda Mrs. Habyarimana is frequently 
in the company of senior French officials in spite of her being categorized as a Category 
one genocide suspect by both the ICTR and Rwanda.190      
The integrity of the tribunal has come under further condemnation as it has repeatedly 
disregarded calls to probe and indict members of the RPF government charged with crimes 
against humanity during the period of the war.191  This lack of prejudice weakens the goal 
of preventing the reoccurrence of such acts against humankind and the politics of impunity.  
In effect those protected by the ruling powers and those with political influence in foreign 
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countries become the advantaged who are able to evade justice while those who are put on 
trial consider themselves debarred thereby preparing for potential conflict.192  The 
achievements of the ITCR are nevertheless to be applauded and proposals to solve the 
challenges that the tribunal is facing ought to be the focal point of the international 
community in order to achieve the desired objectives of the ICTR by 2010.  
The establishment of the tribunal and the pronouncement that on no account again would 
occurrences such as the genocide happen in the world have set a precedent internationally, 
that is to say that crimes against humanity will not go without penalty.193  It is also to be 
appreciated that for the first time the international community assumed accountability for 
the events that transpired in an African country and pledged that this would not occur again 
anywhere else in the world.  This new approach of shared accountability by the 
international community should inspire leaders to take account of their actions with the 
knowledge that they will be liable for their decisions during their period in office and after 
they relinquish power. The tribunal has not completed its mission; it is facing a serious 
challenge of lack of funding to complete the pending investigations before the expiry of its 
mission in 2010.194  The lack of sufficient funding has also meant that the tribunal has been 
unable to compensate those who were wrongfully incarcerated and who now feel that their 
human rights have been violated, the feeling of harassment and victimization on their part 
provides potential for conflict.195  
Other challenges that the tribunal is facing include inability to provide protection for 
witnesses.  There have been several reports about survivors being targeted for giving 
evidence at the courts they have reportedly been singled out and harassed, frightened and 
even murdered to keep them from testifying in the courts a factor that has strained the 
process as the victims are not willing to compromise their own security at home in favour 
of providing evidence.196  The many victims of sexual violence have been stripped of their 
self-esteem bringing into question the humanity accorded by the tribunal towards 
survivors.  In many instances genocide survivors have withheld vital evidence in the face 
of their lack of confidence in the Tribunal due to its shortcomings; this has in turn made 
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the work of the Tribunal even more complicated.197  It should be borne in mind that in 
order to accomplish the goal of preventing similar occurrences in future the ICTR and the 
International Criminal Court that are key in realizing this must be able to achieve their set 
objectives.  
The concept of justice particularly in regard to post conflict reconciliation can have many 
descriptive qualifiers that symbolize diverse rules, procedures and objectives. Moreover 
justice patterns allocate different parties to the function of designer and recipient of the 
judicial process.198  The architects of both the ICTR and the Gacaca courts have provided 
different views of legitimacy to the judicial process through a range of typical standards 
and institutional components. The international community that originated the ICTR 
created a tribunal that follows the system of retributive justice in quest of an end to a 
culture of impunity.199   
Retributive justice regulates impartial response to crime established by lawful evidence, so 
that punishment is rightly imposed and considered as morally correct and fully deserved.  
It is punitive, following the law of retaliation which specifies that reciprocity should be 
equivalent to the wrong suffered.  It focuses on the relationship between defence and 
prosecution and measures success by the fairness of the process and the parity and 
proportionality of the sanctions.200 Additionally legal professionals, who are totally 
impartial, having no connection with the parties in dispute, deal with crimes.201  The 
international community has considered this type of justice a fitting response to the 
Rwandan genocide.202  Not withstanding the mandate of the tribunal to promote 
reconciliation, it is designed to please its draftsmen by demanding penal actions against the 
elite perpetrators of the genocide.  The politicized quality of retributive justice has thereby 
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permitted for the originators of the ICTR to also be its sole recipients leaving Rwandans 
essentially uninfluenced by its process.203 
Restorative justice the alternative to retributive justice is concerned not so much with 
retribution and punishment as it is with healing the victims, making them whole and 
restoring the offenders to a strong and healthy relationship with the community. This 
approach frequently brings an offender and a victim together in order that the offender can 
comprehend better the effect that their wrongdoing had on the victim.  Success is measured 
by the level of integration that the offender is able to achieve and the degree of emotional 
and financial recompense for the victims.204  This process demands that offences be dealt 
with in, and by, the community and differs from retributive justice as it centers on 
reintegrative disgrace over guilt and the impact that this has on reconciliation.  
Reintegrative disgrace or shaming refers to the manner in which the community expresses 
its disapproval, which may vary from a caution to an open degradation ceremony but will 
generally be followed by efforts of acceptance and reintegration into the community.205  In 
the sections that follow it will be shown that the Gacaca model closely resembles that of 
restorative justice. 
5.2 GACACA as Restorative Justice 
The reconstruction of Rwanda’s physical and government structures following the 1994 
genocide was targeted at promoting reconciliation in order to enable the Rwandan people 
in particular the ethnic groups, Hutu and Tutsi, to reconcile and rebuild their communities, 
living together again.206   The Gacaca (community courts) had five principal objectives 
which were intended to eliminate the culture of violence with a view of completely erasing 
the possibility of genocide in the future.  Firstly the Gacaca aimed at uncovering the truth 
pertaining to the events that took place during the period between 1990 and 1995.207  This 
was to be achieved through cross-examination of evidence provided by eyewitnesses who 
thereby exposed the perpetrators.  Secondly the Gacaca aimed at expediting the trial of 
more than three thousand suspects who were incarcerated and who could be guilty but on 
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the other hand could be innocent.208  At the time the Gacaca commenced over three 
thousand detainees were being held and it was therefore in the best interest of 
reconciliation that these suspects be tried and alleviate the burden on government to hasten 
justice for the victims given that delayed justice was equivalent to denied justice.209     
The culture of impunity where atrocities committed by governments against their people 
are ignored and the executors left unpunished is one of the principal reasons for the 
continued conflict in Africa.  The spread of this culture has lent credence to the notion – 
particularly among political leaders that they will not be held accountable for their 
actions.210 The Gacaca courts aimed at eradicating this culture and establishing a record to 
enable people to understand that the contravention of their rights must lead to punishment 
without any omission.   In order for peace to prevail permanently unity must prevail.  
Following the genocide the only way in which unity could be achieved was after pardon 
was extended and efforts made towards reconciliation.211 
The fourth objective therefore was to promote reconciliation among the Rwandans and 
strengthen their unity.  It was argued that once the truth was exposed and the perpetrator 
punished there would be no continued accusation and distrust, the victims could then be 
repaired. The Courts were therefore to be seen as centers for group efforts which would in 
the end be beneficial to the communities, prisoners who were found to be innocent could 
also be reintegrated.212 The wave of new ideas that arose on the continent that were geared 
towards Africans finding their own solutions to their problems provided the chance for 
Rwanda to demonstrate that its people could ably solve their problems using their home 
grown justice systems based on their norms and customs.  Gacaca literally meaning ‘justice 
on the grass’ in reference to the outdoor areas that served as courtrooms.213 
In analyzing the Rwandan Gacaca courts it can be argued that the government has initiated 
a process that combines two differing forms of justice seeking to attain the same results of 
unity and peace in the country.  In reviewing the goals of the courts, it is evident that the 
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anticipated end result can only come from a restorative form of justice, which aims at 
restoring community relationships and equality.  It is consequently impractical to expect 
that the reinstatement of social relationships after genocide will be achieved by two 
disparate systems as justice and reconciliation fused together as one process as this method 
only re-establishes social order and harmony but not justice.214  
The fact that the judges are selected from the local leaders with minimal legal training but 
yet having the authority to condemn the guilty up to life imprisonment leaves much to be 
desired.  Furthermore the plaintiffs who are literally dependant on the clemency of the 
inexperienced judges are not granted defense counsels but rather persuaded with 
inducements to admit their guilt and cooperate.215  Those who actively participate in this 
process particularly in availing evidence against the suspects are often viewed as cohorts of 
the current government while those who stood in defense of the accused are seen as anti 
government.216  With the process moving in this direction it is seen to be acquiring a 
political twist and shifting away from the original objectives.  In view of the very high 
unemployment levels and rampant poverty the Gacaca provided a means of earning a 
living in terms of the inducements offered to witnesses and the benefits that arose in 
defending the accused.217    
 With the lack of legal expertise the courts relied heavily on the statements of the witnesses 
upon which judgment was meted.  In a country with a history of division on ethnic basis 
and hatred long perpetrated along the same lines it is very likely that the testimonies will 
replicate the tribal bias and in so doing crush the end to justice, shedding doubt over the 
efficacy of Gacaca in nurturing reconciliation and averting future conflict.   
The Rwandan government argues that it needs to reduce the population of the prisons and 
jails, which are overcrowded by trying tens of thousands through the Gacaca Courts.  This 
view suggests that justice for both perpetrators and victims is not the primary objective of 
the government and is further demonstrated by the government’s refusal to prosecute its 
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RPF members who committed crimes during the same period through the Gacaca.218 The 
government’s argument is that the RPF’s crimes were crimes of reprisal and hence the 
need for them to be tried in the regular courts and military tribunals.219  It suffices to say 
that unless the circumstances of the 1994 genocide and its underlying causes, which 
include poverty, joblessness, and uneven allocation of resources, are addressed the 
achievement of lasting peace will not be met for a long time to come.  The formerly 
advantaged Hutu who are now suffering in poverty may well blame their state of affairs on 
the social, political and economic segregation by the RPF government that is generally 
recognized as a Tutsi government.220  This view could lead to the perception that the 
solution to getting out of this predicament lies in ousting the current government, a view 
that renders the efforts of the Gacaca futile.  
Even though the government’s objective and the spirit of Gacaca can be applauded it is to 
be pointed out that the results of the process have inclined towards vindicating the 
genocide perpetrators over justifying the victims and survivors.221  The Government’s 
policy of pardoning all those who confess and cooperate with the courts goes against the 
deep-seated principles of justice and disregards the rights of the victims of genocide 
stirring up potential conflict.  This is upon the precept that once criminals are released into 
the communities without any sentence for their crimes already heightened ethnic tensions 
will be aggravated hence threatening the current stability.222 
Worldwide the legal responses that have arisen from the analysis of justice systems 
instituted to counter the actions of repressive regimes have elicited much debate.223  The 
means by which transitional justice systems such as trials, commissions of enquiry and 
compensations have been enacted to address mass acts of violence by governments have 
generated views that are contradictory.  It has been argued that such systems promote 
resolution, settlement, a degree of social equality and the rule of law whereas divergent 
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views advocate that in the end such justice systems that seek a middle ground instead work 
to destroy the very things that they seemingly promote.224  
This chapter continues to provide a caution on the way in which Rwandan national 
politicians may use transitional justice as an expedient or indirect means of punishment in 
a bid to strengthen and mask their dominance of the nation a progression which could be in 
opposition to the very intentions for which Gacaca were designed. Waldorf has described 
the Rwandan peace-building project as the most ambitious experiment in transitional 
justice ever attempted.225  The enormity of human rights violations to which Rwandans 
were exposed during the civil war, the genocide of 1994 and the consequences of the 
genocide provide the thrust to the ambitiousness of the ‘Rwandan experiment’.226  
 
The transitional Rwandan government adopted the organic law n 8/96 concerning acts of 
genocide and crimes against humanity in order to ‘fight the culture of impudence’ and 
‘deal with the past’ as noted above. This move provided several challenges in its 
enforcement for the transitional government and the international community.  Critical 
among these was the lack of sufficient legal personnel to try the great numbers of genocide 
suspects and the lack of enough courts for cases to be heard.227  As a result layers were 
created in the judicial system, the bottomline decentralised Gacaca courts feeding into the 
national courts and the highest court being the international criminal tribunal of Rwanda as 
mentioned in this chapter.      
Over ten thousand Gacaca courts were subsequently created, to which all adult (above 18 
years old) community members were obliged to participate.  Rwanda consequently joined 
the international justice crusade, promoting elements such as truth, rule of law and 
reconciliation.228  Legalised as a modern version of the traditional Gacaca it was argued 
that this mechanism of conflict resolution would support national peace building through 
four avenues.  Firstly, truth would be obtained from the confessions and apologies 
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provided by the perpetrators of genocide; secondly justice would arise from their 
punishment; thirdly, forgiveness by the victims would be realized and finally reconciliation 
by perpetrators, victims and their communities would be confirmed.229 
In order to further support the peace building process, suspects whose confessions were 
deemed ‘true’ by the panel of judges who numbered five had their sentences commuted 
from 25-30 years to 7-15 years where the intention to kill was evidenced and 5-7 years to 
1-5 years where the perpetrator was found to be an accomplice who however did not 
kill.230 Gacaca courts have generated wide interest from various schools of thought as well 
as human rights advocates particularly over the issue of the kind of justice that prevails.  
From the numerous debates three main views emerge:  
i. That Gacaca justice is ‘curative justice’ promoting reconciliation 
ii. That Gacaca justice espouses the need for reprisal  
iii. That Gacaca justice provides a middle ground for both arguments providing a 
balance between both cure and reprisal. 
My own observation within this debate tends towards the second view of Gacaca as 
primarily promoting reprisal.  Whereas long term detention falls under the definition of 
reprisal with the emphasis on punishment, restorative justice on the other hand shuns 
criminal prosecution of offenders in favour of token compensation and allowing victims to 
openly share their experiences as a means of therapy intended to restore social connections 
and maintain the dignity of the victims.231  
Gacaca however does not essentially provide a framework for the establishment of dignity 
of the victims of human rights violation nor the platform for airing of all victims’ 
experiences.  Gacaca Courts for example, do not have the authority to try rape cases, for 
the numerous women who were raped during the genocide period from April to June of 
1994, many of whom were as a result impregnated and or infected with HIV/AIDS, the 
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ordeal of having to live with the stigma of being HIV positive and or having to raise 
children with an unknown father renders the Gacaca justice inequitable.232 
Additionally many victims regard the aspect of commuted sentences where confessions are 
accepted as ‘true’ by the Gacaca Courts as unfair.  This is in light of the fact that prior to 
the Gacaca hearing the perpetrators offered neither confession nor apology to their victims 
but did so in the courts exclusively for purposes of having their sentences lightened and not 
because they acknowledged and were remorseful for their actions.233  The truth was 
consequently made known for personal benefit and not primarily to restore the dignity of 
the victims. The most apparent illustration that Gacaca do not represent an adequate 
opportunity for all victims of human rights abuse to air their experiences is the fact that 
Gacaca courts are restricted to the hearing only of genocide crimes.  
It is noted that the organic law was established to deal with two forms of international 
abuses; genocide and crimes against humanity.  The election of the incumbent president 
Paul Kagame in 2003 saw a significant variation in the original Gacaca legislation in which 
these courts were limited to trying cases committed by the genocide perpetrators seen as 
the Hutu against genocide victims seen as the Tutsi.  However persons identified as Hutu 
against whom any criminal act or violation of human rights was committed by the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (‘RPF’) during the civil war, the genocide period and the 
aftermath of the genocide had no avenue for justice.234  It is therefore in light of these 
circumstances that the insistence by the government on justice for victims of the genocide 
against the backdrop of failure to address crimes within its executive that the question for 
whom justice is sought is key. 
As part of the peace building process ethnic identification and discrimination has been 
outlawed and instead constitutionalism, equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities for 
all Rwandans are being promoted.  While this may appear to be a good approach in the 
aftermath of the genocide the ensuing ‘politics of reprisal’ is considered to be skewed 
against one side of the people and as a result not all Rwandans consider themselves as 
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having equal rights.235  Furthermore as the official dialogue on justice regards the 1994 
genocide as the point of reckoning and in place of the banned ethnic identification the Hutu 
and Tutsi classes have been replaced by their ‘roles’ in the genocide; ‘perpetrators’ and 
‘victims’ respectively, this government propagated categorization does not provide support 
for reconciliation but instead creates a divide along ethnic lines.236  Brubaker 2002 argues 
that the process of ethicizing of guilt (the Hutu perpetrators) and suffering (the 
Tutsi/survivors) fuels feelings of ethnic groupness. It presents a contextual frame of 
meaning through which people organize their experiences identifying consequently with a 
particular group.237  
This official description of the Rwandan peoples not only augments the fear of the ‘ethnic 
other’ among those who consider themselves as ‘survivors’ (victims) but increasingly this 
same fear is being extended among those categorized as perpetrators who construe the 
official categorization as one of continuing brutality through a different angle. In this 
report I have highlighted the academic debate on traditional justice which has until recently 
been subject to the positive claims regarding the impact of transitional justice mechanism 
on societies. Among these is the opinion that the recognition of past human rights 
violations will make known the truth; a gathering of a states memory of past events that 
will result in a process of restoration and repair of the nation.238 
It should be taken seriously that Rwandans will not easily forget the crimes committed 
against their own families neither will they consider the justice process which negates their 
sufferings as legitimate. Those personal memories of violence will instead of fading be 
transformed into social memories, which together with discourses of injustice will form 
common ground among an ethnic group.239  In view of the fact that social memories of the 
1959 revolution were a key reference point for the descent into violence against the Tutsis 
by the Rwanda Hutus in 1994 the decision to hold an official memory that continues to 
wedge a divide between ethnic groups and the prejudiced justice system in Rwanda may 
prove to be destructive.240 
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There is a need therefore to expound the pros of transitional justice mechanisms with 
prudence.  It should also be recommended that time be taken to carefully reflect upon the 
meaning of the term transitional justice in relation to the prevailing doctrine of political 
transition. The transitory approach coupled with calls for justice envisages the means of 
progression from an authoritarian regime characterised by impunity towards one of 
democracy and the rule of law. This conclusion however questions the reality of a 
government that is unable to address the shortcomings of its own executive in dealing with 
crimes committed against its people and whose mode of governance continues to be 
described as dictatorial by scholars and the local populace alike.   
This chapter explored the Rwandan transitional justice system, looking at its strength and 
weaknesses. The Gacaca system of community justice was discussed highlighting its 
immense challenges. The Gacaca traditional justice was exposed as a tool of government 
to create new identities of victims and perpetrators in Rwanda hence raising concerns in 
Rwanda’s approach to post-conflict reconstruction. It has been observed that the 
professionalism of the Gacaca judges is questionable since their level of education and 
training is below modern standards. It was also observed in this chapter that unless both the 
Tutsi and Hutu victims of genocide are treated equally, the program would not have 
achieved its intended objectives.  This chapter further argued that justice has been served 
to the victims since the perpetrators can go free just for acknowledging guilt. Many alleged 
perpetrators confess and create stories of what happened just to be pardoned or to have 
their sentences reduced. It was discovered that unless the Rwandan government allows the 
prosecution of the alleged RPF crimes, the Gacaca program would continue to be seen as a 
tool of the RPF government to oppress the opposition. The establishment, achievements, 
failures and challenges of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was analysed. It 
was observed that it has not performed to the popular expectations. It should be mentioned 
therefore that some domestic mechanisms in post-conflict reconstruction could be counter 
productive as seen in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
 In this chapter, a summary of the main findings is given.  The chapter ends 
with a conclusion with reference to the hypothesis of the research report 
and recommendation.   
6. Conclusion and Recommendations 
6.1 Conclusion 
This research study set out to assess the role of domestic mechanisms in post-conflict 
reconstruction and development with the focus of the study being the Republic of Rwanda. 
It is reiterated in this report that visionary participation and decentralisation, based on the 
principles of equitable management and resource distribution, and fostered by institutions 
of good governance ensure sustainable peace and development in post conflict states. It has 
been reported that in order find workable solutions for reconstruction, a clear 
understanding of the root causes of the conflict is necessary. Policies of exclusion and 
marginalisation that persisted in the history of Rwanda, coupled with the legacies of 
colonial and post-colonial policies were primarily responsible for the 1990-1994 conflict. 
This report portrayed Rwanda as a success story not because it got all the policies right, but 
because it made significant strides in a short time. This was in consideration of the impact 
left by the 1994 genocide. The implementation of both domestic mechanisms and the 
proposed policies from international organisations has shown that Rwanda is determined to 
break away from the shackles that have kept Africa stack in poverty and under-
development. The government’s zero tolerance to corruption for example has attracted 
more development partners in the country. This report further observed that the successes 
of Rwanda’s reconstruction project were mainly due to the emphasis on homegrown 
mechanisms as opposed to the proposed reconstruction policies from international 
organisations and donors. A partnership between the donors, the government and the local 
population was discussed as the approach preferred by the Rwandan government for its 
post-conflict reconstruction.  
This research report investigated the different domestic programs adopted by the Rwandan 
government in its reconstruction process. The electoral reforms, infrastructure reforms and 
the refinement of the economic development and poverty reduction strategy program to 
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suit the Rwandan situation was the focus of the transitional government. This report further 
analysed the national reconstruction programs namely; the national unity and reconciliation 
commission and the Gacaca system of justice. It was observed that these domestic 
programs registered significant successes in promoting peace and stability and propelled 
the nation to a quick and sustainable recovery. It has been mentioned however, that even 
though Rwanda has been moving in the right direction, there are still very considerable 
challenges that may threaten the national achievements so far.   
6.2 Recommendations  
It is widely agreed that conflict has its origin in and is a consequence of governance 
failure. Correcting for such failures and tackling their principal causes are tasks key to post 
conflict reconstruction (PCR).  Among the causes, issues like disputed allotment of 
ownership of natural resources or the need to develop a constitution that acknowledges and 
defends the rights of different ethnic groups without dividing the population are matters 
that necessitate long term national and institutional transformation.  The need to initiate 
and maintain PCR is vital to permit countries that have undergone conflict to escape the 
vicious sequence of state failure, increasing discrimination, poverty and conflict and 
advance to a virtuous cycle of good governance, democracy, equal opportunity, 
independence and growth. In order to achieve this outcome, this report has shown that 
domestic mechanisms offer the best chances as evidenced by the case of post conflict 
Rwanda. 
In incorporating the proposed policies by international organisations and donors, post 
conflict Rwanda came up with unique home grown mechanisms to tackle the root souses of 
the 1994 genocide and lay a strong foundation for peace, unity and sustainable 
development. The quick recovery of Rwanda after a horrific genocide has left the 
international community with a desire to urge post conflict nations to develop their own 
strategies for recovery and development.  The rebuilding of functional institutions, 
emphasis on good governance and a deliberate promotion of unity and reconciliation 
through traditional means has characterised the post conflict reconstruction process of 
Rwanda. It is important to note however, that in the pursuit of peace, unity and 
development some PCR approaches has done more to risk the resumption of conflict than 
advance unity, stability and development. 
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PCR is however an all-embracing expression and takes into account both interim 
humanitarian aid and continuing stratagems to support sustainable development and 
assimilate the country within the global economy.  Providing infrastructure is a key factor 
in the shift towards peace. Several hypothetical and practical issues in relation to 
infrastructure planning in PCR have been argued in this report.  What is significant here is 
that currently infrastructure intervention in PCR appears to be predominantly ‘hard’ 
material investments while the function of ‘soft’ institutions; participation and creating of 
alliances for change are deferred to later points in time.   Rebuilding of local institutions is 
critical to upholding peace in Rwanda.241    
The post 1994 Rwanda government has put in place an extensive decentralisation plan, 
which has given rise to the delegation of major central government roles to the regional or 
provincial, district and sector levels.  The government’s objective is to realize better 
management of its departments, institutions and improved delivery of services.  This 
process is also intended to simplify the supervision of government project and avail more 
resources where they are required most and to curb corruption. 
In order for the achievement of success in any post-conflict state, the reinstatement of 
order and security is essential.  As observed in this report, the disintegration of civil order 
during conflict makes way for the interference in the operation of   important social 
institutions, which result in chaos. While conciliatory measures usually begin with the 
positioning of substantial military might, the cause of peace and order can only be 
completely served if attention is directed to the reinforcement of the capacity for lasting 
regular policing by citizens of the country. The Ingando initiative among other things is 
supposed to instill patriotism so that the citizens take part in ensuring national security and 
development.242  
The discharge and disarmament of former soldiers and the efforts to reintegrate them into 
society is a constituent of the process of re-establishing order and security.  The methods of 
disarmament discharge and reintegration must provide for the fracturing of the cycle of 
violence and cultivate conditions for sustainable growth and security.  One area of concern 
is that gainful employment be found for those who are discharged particularly the youth 
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including young women in order that they do not have any consideration to turn to the use 
of arms to fend for themselves or to engage in unlawful activities.  International aim may 
come to the rescue in providing funding for reintegration for discharged persons however 
the commitment to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) must not be 
temporary. 
Grassroot methods have shown to be more effective and sustainable in the Rwanda’s 
reconstruction process.  They nonetheless create difficulties that need to be dealt with.  
Firstly there are substantial numbers of people at this level and at best policies can be put 
into operation to reach the leadership at local and community levels but very frequently 
these plans represent points of contact with the masses rather than an all-encompassing 
programme for touching and empowering them. Secondly the majority of people at this 
level are in a state of endurance in which attaining their most basic needs such as shelter, 
water, food and safety is a daily struggle.  Peasants cannot comprehend elaborate 
programmes and ideas when their essential needs are wanting.   
Local methods in post conflict reconstruction must have a clear strategy for poverty 
alleviation.  The achievement of this agenda is dependent on four important factors; first, 
total public spending must rise steadily and remain at a high for a continued period in order 
to boost the economy thereby improving collective demand and income and widening the 
tax base.  Second as public spending rises resources must be reallocated away from 
military or security causes and directed towards development of economic infrastructure 
and socially productive investments such as education, health care – particularly 
preventative care, provision of safe drinking water, nutrition programs etc.243 The 
renaissance of the rural sector is essential to economic progress in Rwanda. Third, 
government revenues need to increase to cater for higher public spending and to minimise 
deficits.  The increase in revenue will necessitate investment in building administrative 
capacity (human resources and expertise), transformation of the tax systems and putting 
into effect accountability to lessen pilferages and widening of the tax base through 
economic diversification.244 Fourth the effort of reconstruction must be supported by 
higher external funding by way of development aid and debt relief.  Foreign sources must 
however plainly focus on poverty alleviation programs and in addition external funding 
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must be complementary and stimulating for mobilisation of local resources.  Aid must 
bring in rather than push out local resources.245        
In order to steer clear of future conflict, realize peace and promote comprehensive 
development, government reforms are frequently vital in order to create institutions that 
are contributory, owned by the state without the notion of having been forced from outside.  
Provisional institutions can help in the achieving of this objective.  As part of the post-
conflict recovery efforts, it is crucial that the basic governance institutions are able to 
perform basic law making, policing, legal arbitration, policy formulation and execution 
roles.  
The requirements of special needs groups need to be taken into consideration in the 
development of plans and programmes.  Special needs groups are those categories of 
persons for whom programmes must be tailored to their unique requirements.  These 
include women, children, youth, the disables, the elderly, ex-soldiers, female and child ex-
soldiers, internally displaced persons, refugees, single parent households, victims of sexual 
violence, and HIV positive persons among others.      Occasionally general programmes 
can bring about increased vulnerability for special needs groups if steps are not taken to 
moderate such outcomes.  While in other cases focusing on a particular group can result in 
an unbalanced impact on the overall situation.    
Programmes targeted for example at addressing the special needs of women in the post-
conflict setting impact on the livelihood of households, family health, education among 
other things and tend to have far reaching effects well beyond the initial target group.   
Likewise effective DDR programmes that successfully reintegrate ex-soldiers into their 
communities have a far reaching impact not only in regard to the element of national 
security but also within the element of socio-economic development and reconciliation. 
Calculated support to community associations, organisations and groups tackling 
reconciliation and peace matters is vital.  At the outset they must be recognised carefully as 
they will in future provide the framework for reconciliation in communities.  Such groups 
could also develop into doorways in the effort to raise household and community incomes.    
Frequently the origins of a conflict have been seen to arise from economic factors; low or 
dwindling per capita income or disproportionate sharing of the rewards from the utilisation 
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of a country’s resources, for example in the case of natural resource industries which give 
high rents and national opportunities.  Often new institutions are expected to create 
economic policy however such institutions will not come out merely because new 
buildings have been commissioned or persons appointed to important positions.  Long term 
planning and preparation are required for the building of economic institutions and they 
cannot be imposed as a basic or temporary arrangement.  From the onset creation of 
policies for development must be viewed not simply as a technical issue but instead as part 
of a policy for the country to develop in a manner that will reduce the potential for conflict 
and be made to last.  These policies must be comprehensive, involving both men and 
women and geared towards maintaining peaceful development.  Policies such as these 
should not be observed to just fulfill a list of desired policies formulated by external parties 
but must belong to the country, be recognised by the Government and have secured wide 
political acceptance as directing the way forward for the nation’s recovery and economic 
development. 246 
The necessity to have new and more creative institutions, models and procedures of 
transitional justice and reconciliation remains outstanding in Rwanda in particular and 
Africa in general.  It demands that all national plans and resources available to achieve this 
objective be encouraged.  The recovery of Rwanda from one of the most terrible 
experiences of genocide in the 21st century should be viewed as an opportunity for the 
Great Lakes Region and for Africa. 
Following the genocide there was a collapse of the legal system which meant the absence 
of lawyers and judges, requiring the intervention of the international community to train, 
build capacity and perhaps bring in legal personnel (Lawyers and judges) from other 
countries to address the immediate needs.  In addition the international community has a 
role to play in the facilitation and support of the establishment of truth commissions and 
the distribution of results from these commissions.  Their role also goes as far as aiding in 
the creation of local institutions, structures and culture to encourage accountability for 
human rights violations and respect for the rule of law.  There stands an opportunity for the 
international community to undertake a partnership role with the Government in 
empowering the society victimised by abuse In this case, organisations like ‘Ibuka’ (the 
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association of genocide survivors) should be funded.  This requires the presence of locally 
owned means coupled with technical assistance and monitoring provided internationally.   
On the pursuit of unity and reconciliation, the government has established relevant 
commissions to foster unity and reconciliation but they have left a lot to be desired. The 
Rwandan government continues to cover up the truth that hostilities are still prevalent and 
even thrive in Rwandan society.  Even though there are some Rwandans who may bear the 
opinion that the seeds of reconciliation have been sown and are starting to bear fruit there 
are many others who talk of animosity, a seething among the populace with the potential to 
explode. For Ingando to be successful its participants must assimilate its theories of unity 
and reconciliation and incorporate them into their daily lifestyles to ensure that they last 
long after they have departed from the solidarity camps.  The emphasis on political 
indoctrination also seriously challenges Ingando as a means of reconciliation.  Additionally 
the government’s sustained assault on civil society and apparent political opposition 
threaten to further weaken reconciliation programs like Ingando.  Should Ingando be 
incorporated into school curriculums and should the leaders of Ingando create a prospectus 
that includes truthful and critical assessment of the current administration and open 
dialogue about history then Ingando can be a commendable and creative part of the 
complicated matter of community healing.247      
Rwanda is a small country in which each region has its own unique make up determined by 
political history, mode of governance, social setup, closeness to borders, guidelines for 
exclusion, marginalisation, ethnic benefits and special treatment.  Movements among the 
populace have also had an impact on the social setting in each region. The National Unity 
and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) ought to refine and refocus its strategy by 
developing the functioning programme goals in each region basing on solid analysis of the 
political and situational environment, on the ground fact finding, engaging the locals in 
developing programmes and allowing communities to become agents for executing NURC 
programmes.248    
The Gacaca system has serious weaknesses, it comes with both positive and negative 
elements but it is nonetheless not difficult to conclude that it is a lot better than nothing.  
Unlike the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) the Gacaca is homegrown 
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having been created by Rwandans specifically to address their problems and as such is 
likely to raise the public’s confidence.  Another positive feature of Gacaca is that it 
represents a huge step towards acknowledging individual criminal responsibility.  This is 
of great significance in a nation where impunity has existed for long in respect to state 
authorised crimes.  It brings to light the view that people are ultimately responsible for 
their actions even if they have been sanctioned by the powers that be.  For the victims, trial 
and retribution are significant roads to redress.249      
In order for a criminal process to be meaningful where the truth is unearthed it requires that 
a comprehensive investigation be done and that a capable, autonomous and unbiased forum 
is in place to do this.  The proficiency and objectivity of the Gacaca judges is questionable 
and is one of the main challenges of these courts, it is in addition one that cannot be 
entirely resolved as the system is based on the philosophy of locally made justice.  
Additional challenges are access to justice and the issue of security.  These issues are 
however not impossible to resolve, on the other hand there is the concern over the issue of 
compensation which has been subjected to endless debate.250  
In the eyes of the victims justice cannot be total without some form of recompense even if 
it is merely symbolic.  It is expected that the creation of new laws will provide a more 
comprehensive system of recompense.  In light of Rwanda’s expectation of a peaceful 
future it is very distressful that there is no solution for all victims thereby including victims 
of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.  The objectives of Gacaca to attain 
truth, justice and reconciliation, have created huge expectations and in the end the inability 
to deal with RPF crimes of a very similar nature could very well thwart the achievement of 
these goals.  For the success of Gacaca the judges need to be better skilled in the areas of 
the law and the process.  Eligibility for such roles should be conditioned upon achieving a 
defined standard of reading and writing, in addition to a system where the background of 
elected judges is verifiable to avoid future replacements. Judges also require better 
remuneration in order to perform their difficult roles in coming times as well as to prevent 
them from being compromised.251  
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Protection for victims, witnesses and confessing architects of crime is key, it is challenging 
that the common perception is that each citizen bears responsibility for their own security 
and safety.  Rwanda must continue to indict and penalise those liable for threats and 
brutality against victims, witnesses and confessing perpetrators.  Protection should be in 
place during the court sessions and in addition judges must be strict on this point and 
should not permit any ill behaviors during the sessions.  Victims should have access to 
information on the status of the prisoners and should be informed when eventually mass 
releases are to be conducted.   
In conclusion Rwanda needs to allow the crimes committed by the RPF to be uncovered.  
The government’s failure to address these crimes is a major failing of the Rwandan justice 
system.  The political climate in the country has stifled the voices of the victims of these 
crimes; having all voices of opposition labelled as advocates of division is not compatible 
with civil and political rights of the populace.  A genuine fight against impunity cannot be 
prejudiced, it instead needs to emphasize that all individuals must bear responsibility for 
the acts or omissions.  The rule of law must be equally applied otherwise the construction 
of a democratic society for all groups will not succeed. 
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